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ABSTRACT 
The Soviet Union, with the cooperation of the Scott Polar 
Research Institute, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, and the Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institution, has recently undertaken the 
Northern Sea Route Project, an effort to ascertain the 
feasibility of opening the shipping route along the Arctic coast 
of the Soviet Union, from the Norwegian frontier to the Bering 
Strait. The goal is to operate the route on a year-round basis, 
offering it to commercial shippers as a substantially shorter 
alternative route from northern Europe to the Pacific Ocean in 
the hope of raising hard currency in exchange for pilotage, 
icebreaking, refueling, and other services. 
Meanwhile, the international law of the sea has been 
developing at a rapid pace, creating, among other things, a right 
of transit passage that allows, subject to specified conditions, 
the relatively unrestricted passage of all foreign vessels --
commercial and military -- through straits used for international 
navigation. In addition, transit passage permits submerged 
transit by submarines and overflight by aircraft, practices with 
implications for the national security of states bordering 
straits. 
This thesis summarizes the law of the sea as it relates to 
straits used for international navigation, and then describes 43 
significant straits of the Northeast Arctic Passage, identifying 
the characteristics of each that are relevant to a determination 
of whether the strait will be subject to transit passage. 
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I PREFACE 
Geographical names (except for the seas) are in Russian, as 
are most of the useful maps and charts of the area. When an 
English name differs significantly from the Russian in spelling 
or is quite well known, . it is included parenthetically on the 
first entry, and occasionally on subsequent ones. The style of 
transcription is that adopted by the Scott Polar Research 
Institute, but quotations follow the original transcription. A 
brief glossary of geographical terms appears in the appendixes. 
Most of the physical description of straits is taken from 
the Hydrographer of the Navy's Pilot series (Arctic Pilot 1985, 
Bering Sea Pilot 1980, White Sea Pilot 1973). The measurements 
indicate the width of the strait at its narrowest and either the 
least known depth or the range of known depths. Distances are 
indicated in nautical miles (1/60 of a degree of latitude) and 
cables ( 1 / 10 of a nautical mile), depths in meters. Coordinates, 
which are included parenthetically in the descriptions of straits 
in Chapter IV, are meant only to facilitate location on a map or 
chart, most of which do not identify all the straits and islands 
mentioned here, and the choice of coordinates is not methodical: 
Sometimes the coordinates locate the center of a strait, 
sometimes one side of an entrance passage, sometimes the center 
of an adjacent island. The citation at the end of each 
description identifies the strait's principal entry in the Pilot 
series and is not meant to attribute all data in the description, 
particularly those regarding baselines, to the Pilot series. 
This paper contains little in the way of geographic, 
economic , political , or historical information on the Northeast 
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) Passage or the Northern Sea Route, and what there is is not new. 
It is borrowed from other sources, primarily Butler's Northeast 
Arctic Passage, Armstrong's The Northern Sea Route, and 
Armstrong ' s many years of reportage of the development and 
operations of the Northern Sea Route. Much of the commentary on 
the international law of the sea is based on treatises by the 
late D.P. O'Connell (1982) and by R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe 
(1988). Because of my own language limitations, I have relied 
on English translations by Butler, Armstrong, and Franckx. For 
information on the geography, history, economics, politics, and 
administration, the following sources, all in English, are 
recommended: Armstrong 1952, Butler 1978, Krypton 1953, Krypton 
1956, and Armstrong's annual reports in Polar Record on the 
previous year's developments in the Northern Sea Route. 
If there is anything original in this paper, it is in the 
application of the developing rules of the law of the sea to the 
specific straits along the Northern Sea Route in an effort to 
determine what effect the internationalization of those straits 
would have on their legal status. Inasmuch as the transit 
passage regime is quite recent (in fact, the convention that 
created it has not yet come into effect) and not yet the subject 
of any international litigation or incident, many of its 
implications are unclear, and this paper does not provide any 
definitive answers. It aims, instead, at raising and 
investigating pertinent questions before they become contentious. 
vii 
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Introduction 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
introduced to international law a new concept -- the right of 
transit passage through straits used for international navigation 
-- which under certain conditions permits relatively free passage 
by ships, overflight by aircraft, and submerged transit by 
submarine through the territorial sea and even the · internal 
waters of a coastal state, activities that have significant 
implications for national security of states bordering straits. 
This new right of transit passage is the principal component 
of a new legal regime governing straits used for international 
navigation. In many cases the new regime is not likely to have 
a major impact on international navigation or on coastal state 
security because much of the area to which the new rules are 
being applied were, until recently, regarded as high seas and 
thus subject to even more liberal rules of passage. 
Nevertheless, in a three-mile-wide belt along each coast of most 
straits and in the entirety of some smaller straits, the 1982 
convention applies the new regime to waters that for many years 
have been regarded as territorial sea and thus, but for the new 
regime, subject to the more restrictive rules of innocent 
passage, which do not include a right of overflight or submerged 
transit. In these cases, the new . regime of transit passage 
substantially decreases the jurisdiction of coastal states over 
the straits waters in question. 
Quite independently of developments in the law of the sea, 
the Soviet Union has been proceeding with a plan to develop the 
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Northern Sea Route into a year-round operation and to open it to 
international commercial shipping, with the intention of earning 
hard currency by charging for pilotage, icebreaking, and weather 
forecasting services. If this plan should be realized, many of 
the major straits of the Northeast Passage, along the northern 
coast of the Soviet Union from the Norwegian border to the Bering 
Strait, arguably would become straits "used for international 
navigation" within the meaning of the 1982 convention and thus 
subject to the new regime. It would, for example, arguably 
prohibit the Soviet Union from denying access to Proliv 
Vil'kitskogo (Vil'kitskiy Strait) to United States Coast Guard 
icebreakers, as was done in 1967. (Franckx 1988) 
This paper will attempt to ascertain the ef feet that opening 
the Northern Sea Route to foreign traffic would have on the legal 
status of the Northeast Passage straits along the route. It will 
do so by examining the new regime of international straits as it 
applies to the waters of the Soviet Arctic and by attempting to 
identify the specific straits that will be affected if the plan 
to open the Northern Sea Route succeeds. 
There are two major qualifications to any claims for 
significance of this paper: First, the project may well not 
succeed, leaving the Northern Sea Route a purely domestic 
transport route largely unaffected by international shipping and 
international law; that in itself is not a reason to abandon or 
postpone this study, for the issues raised here have a direct 
bearing on the willingness of the Soviet Union to promote the 
venture. Second, the specific body of law with which the paper 
is concerned has not yet come into effect and may never do so; 
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nevertheless, there is reason to believe that it may come into 
effect within a few years (Larson 1989), and the Soviet Union has 
already ratified it. Furthermore, strong arguments can be made 
(though not here) that the twelve-mile territorial sea and the 
regime of straits used for international navigation have been so 
generally accepted that they have become norms of customary law 
independent of the effectiveness of the convention from which 
they sprang (Langdon 1990; Burke and DeLeo 1983:407-408), but 
this argument is said, despite some historically validity, to 
deny the proceedings and results of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), at which the 1982 
convention was negotiated and adopted. (Larson 1987:427) 
The terms "Northeast Passage" and "Northern Sea Route" are 
frequently used interchangeably. As Professor William Butler 
observes, however, the terms do not describe the same entity. 
The .Northeast Passage is the geographical area from the Soviet-
Norwegian frontier to the Bering Strait, comprising the waters 
and islands of the Barents, White, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, 
and Chukchi Seas. The Northern Sea Route is a "domestic 
transport concept," a cabotage route from European Russia to 
Vladivostok and serving northern Siberia and the Far East . 
(Butler 1988:9; Franckx 1991b:33) This paper is concerned with 
the Arctic straits of the Northeast Passage to the extent that 
they form a part of the Northern Sea Route, for it is these 
straits whose legal status may change if the Soviet government 
succeeds in attracting foreign shipping to its Arctic shores. 
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I. Opening the Northern Sea Route 
Opening the Northern Sea Route could result in "a 
substantial reorientation of the sea freighting patterns of the 
northern hemisphere [and] would seem to offer benefits all 
round." (Armstrong 1991a) The project, in one form or another, 
has been on the Soviet agenda for a quarter century. 
A. Early Efforts 
The first attempt by the Soviet government to earn hard 
currency by opening the Northern Sea Route to foreign shipping 
occurred at the close of the 1966 shipping season with the 
publication of a brochure offering access to the route on payment 
of fees for the services of Soviet icebreakers, pilots, and 
refueling and other facilities at the remote ports along the 
route. The charges listed in the brochure were based on the size 
of the ship, its iceworthiness, and its proposed date of passage. 
A ship of good ice classification would be charged at the same 
rate year round; ships of lower classification would enjoy the 
same low rate for about six weeks of the summer season but a 
significantly higher rate at other times. (Armstrong 1968a:202-
203; 1968b:332) Viktor G. Bakayev, the minister of the merchant 
marine , confirmed the offer at the start of the 1967 season 
(Anderson 1967) , and the Soviet freighter Novovoronezh made a 
demonstration run through the Northern Sea Route , loading at 
Havre , Antwerp , Rotterdam, and Hamburg , and arriving at Yokohama 
on 25 August , 27 days aft e r leaving Hamburg, escorted by four 
icebreakers at different times. Nevertheless, de spite an 
advertized saving of 4,332 nautica l mile s on a voyage from 
Yokohama to London (compared to the usual r oute throug h t he Suez 
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Canal), it attracted no foreign shippers. This may have been 
due, at least in part, to a tacit withdrawal of the offer by the 
Soviet government to avoid the appearance that it was offering 
the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to the Suez Canal, which 
had been closed to shipping during the 1967 Middle East war. 
(Franckx 1991:37-38; Armstrong 1972a:119, 1972b:377, 1970:52) 
In August 1977, the Soviet icebreaker Arktika sailed to the 
North Pole, demonstrating that much of the ice, in summer at 
least, is navigable and raising the possibility of a trans-Arctic 
shipping route (Armstrong 1978:186). The following summer, the 
icebreaker Sibir' accompanied the freighter Kapitan Myshevskiy 
on a high-latitude demonstration voyage from Murmansk to Mys 
Serdtse-Kamen in the Chukchi Sea; on its return voyage west, the 
Sibir' was completely stopped by an ice floe in the East Siberian 
Sea and there are indications that she was unable to follow the 
planned route. (Armstrong 1979:500) (map, p. A-1) Since then, 
there appears to have been little discussion of such a trans-
Arctic route. 
In 1984, the "polar experiment" began, using the Northern 
Sea Route, instead of the Panama Canal, to ship goods from the 
west coast of North . America to European Russia . ( Shabad 
1984:259) The experiment was apparently successful, or at least 
promising, as two years later Mikhail Gorbachev, in his 
Vladivostok speech, stressed the need to "speed up measures to 
increase the economic benefit of through traffic on the Northern 
Sea Route , " which Armstrong interpreted as an order to put more 
emphasis on developing the through route. (Armstrong 1987:589; 
Franckx 1991 : 35) It is not only for international traffic that 
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the route is important, however. It is viewed by many Soviet 
economists as crucial to the economic well being of the Soviet 
Arctic and Far East. (Berezovokov 1986) 
The next indication that the Soviet government was still 
interested in opening the coastal route to foreign shipping came 
in Gorbachev's Murmansk speech of 1 October 1987: 
Through the Arctic runs the shortest sea route from 
Europe to the Far East, the Pacific Ocean. I believe, 
depending on the evolution of the normalization of 
international relations, that we could open the 
Northern Sea Route for foreign shipping subject to the 
use of our icebreaker pilotage. (Franckx 1991:38) 
The Murmansk speech has been described as "represent [ ing] the 
first wave in a Soviet diplomatic offensive directed towards the 
Arctic and the Nordic states." (Scrivener 1989:5) 
In a limited sense, the opening may have already begun. 
Japanese vessels have been using part of the route since before 
1967. (Anderson 1967) In 1989, foreign shippers chartered the 
Soviet vessel Tiksi for hard currency and took it through the 
Northern Sea Route from Hamburg to Osaka. (Franckx 1991:38) The 
ship traversed the Northern Sea Route both ways between August 
and November, calling at Chinese and Japanese ports . Two other 
freighters traversed the Northern Sea Route from western Europe 
to Japan in 23 days that year, 10 days less than the Suez route. 
(Armstrong 1989:128) Afterward, Izvestiya was able to announce 
that, "for the first time in its history, the Northern Sea Route 
provided the country with foreign currency II (Franckx 
1991:38) The article also declared that the Soviet government 
could guarantee foreign vessels safe passage in less than two 
weeks through the Northern Sea Route during August and September. 
The relatively short target period, compared with the 
government's object of year-round navigation, has been attributed 
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-to the disaster of August 1983, when 50 ships were trapped in ice 
in Proliv Longa (Long Strait), between Ostrov Vrangelya (Wrangel 
Island) and the continent, with the loss of one and damage to as 
many as 30 others. (Franckx 1991:39) 
B. The Northern Sea Route Project 
The present plan to open the Northern Sea Route to 
international shipping began to take form in June 1990 at a 
meeting in Oslo, held under the auspices of Dr. Willy 0streng, 
the director of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute. The meeting was 
attended by Norwegian and Soviet academics, representatives of 
the Norwegian and Soviet shipping industries, and scientists from 
the Scott Polar Research Institute and the Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution. It was decided that a pilot study 
should be undertaken to help determine the advantages, 
difficulties, and costs of opening the Northern Sea Route by 
considering the availability of sources for a detailed assessment 
of the physical attributes and environmental factors, the 
potential for commercial shipping, and the legal and political 
implications. (Armstrong 1991) 
At a second meeting, in Leningrad in October 1990, under the 
auspices of the Research Institute of the Ministry of the 
Merchant Fleet, the pilot study began with the establishment of 
working groups, each with Soviet and other members. (Armstrong 
1991) A memorandum of understanding was signed, and the Soviet 
Union agreed to make all relevant data available to the other 
institutes. (SPRI 1991) At the time, it was thought that the 
pilot study would take six months to complete, and a third 
meeting is planned for Oslo in June 1991. If the pilot study 
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reaches a favorable conclusion, it could lead to an in-depth 
study of several years' duration. (Armstrong 1991) 
Terence Armstrong of the Scott Polar Research Institute, who 
participated in both meetings and who has chronicled the 
development of the Northern Sea Route for the past three decades, 
has written: "If the natural obstacles, hitherto regarded as 
prohibitively difficult, can be shown to be surmountable at 
economic cost and without unacceptable damage to the environment, 
then traffic in both directions might gain from using this new 
link." (1991a) 
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II. The Maritime Zones 
To understand the potential effect on the Arctic straits of 
the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route requires a 
basic familiarity with the structure that the law of the sea has 
imposed on the world's oceans. 
A. An Introduction to the Law of the Sea 
Until relatively recently, perhaps until the early 1960s, 
access to the use of the seas was governed by four long-standing 
principles: (1) a complex of rights commonly called the freedom 
of navigation on the high seas; ( 2) a three-mile-wide territorial 
sea; (3) a resultant belt of high seas in most of the important 
straits of the world; and (4) a right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea. (Reisman 1980: 54) This system was largely 
preserved by the conventions that emerged from the 1958 Law of 
the Sea Conference principally the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (TSC 1958) and the 
Convention of the High Seas (HSC 1958) -- but since that time 
they have been fairly persistently eroded in favor of what has 
come to be known as "creeping jurisdiction," the gradual but 
continual broadening of the authority of states to regulate the 
use of the waters off their coast. This section will briefly 
describe the recent development and current status of the law of 
the sea as it relates to international straits. 
The international law of the sea is generally regarded as 
being derived from two sources: customary international law and 
international conventions. Customary international law, like 
conventional law, is based on the principle of consent by states. 
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To show the existence of a rule of customary law, two elements 
must be established: (1) a general and consistent practice by 
states, and (2) opinio juris, a belief by the states that the 
practice is either required or permitted by customary 
international law. To maintain the element of consent, states 
that persistently object to an emerging rule of customary law 
will not be bound by it. 
Conventions, sometimes called treaties or agreements, are 
the clearest possible evidence of a state's consent to be bound 
by a legal undertaking, and they may be used to modify legal 
rights and obligations arising under customary international law 
or under earlier conventions. The principal conventional sources 
of the law of the sea are the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the High 
Seas (HSC 1958), the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (TSC 
1958), the Continental Shelf (CSC 1958), and Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (FC 1958). 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC 
1982) alters many of the rights and duties of states established 
by the 1958 conventions and by customary law. When, if ever, it 
comes into effect, its provisions will be binding as among the 
states that are parties to it, but their relations with non-
parties and the relations among non-parties will continue to be 
governed by the -1958 conventions, where applicable, and otherwise 
by customary international law. Analysis is further complicated 
by arguments that some provisions of the ' 1982 convention have 
passed into customary law. (Langdon 1990; O'Connell 1982:570) 
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I B. The Maritime Zones 
The seas of the world are divided into zones, and applied 
t o each zone is a set of rules, derived from customary and 
conventional international law, governing the nature and the 
subject matter of the jurisdiction a coastal state may exercise 
in the waters off its coast. Briefly, the zones are, in 
increasing order of coastal state jurisdiction, the high seas, 
the exclusive economic rn (EEZ), the contiguous rn, the 
territorial sea, and the internal waters, which are divided from 
the territorial sea by baselines. Following is a brief 
definition of "baselines" and of each of the zones and a 
description of the legal regime that attaches to each of them. 
1. Baselines 
It is from the baselines that the coastal zones are 
measured. As a general rule, "the normal baseline is the 
low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts 
officially recognized by the coastal State." (LOSC 1982: article 
5; TSC 1958: . article 3) When, however, this is impossible or 
impracticable because of a deeply indented coastline or the 
presence of reefs, bays, river mouths, off-shore islands, low-
tide elevations , or harbor works , a coastal state is permitted 
to draw s traight baselines, with the effect of enclosing a 
greater area as internal waters and pushing the other zones of 
c oastal state jurisdiction farther into the high seas . (LOSC 
1982 : article 7 ; TSC 1958 : articles 4) (Generally on baselines , 
O'Connell 1982:171-230; Churchill and Lowe 1988, chapte r 2 ) . 
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2. Internal Waters 
Internal waters are the waters on the landward side of the 
baselines (LOSC 1982: article 8; TSC 1958: article 5(1)). For 
the most part, this means bays, estuaries, ports, and any coastal 
waters enclosed by straight baselines. Internal waters are 
regarded as an integral part of the coastal state, which 
possesses full territorial sovereignty over them. Consequently, 
ships of foreign states have no rights of passage through 
internal waters and must rely upon the permission of the coastal 
state. 
The only exception to this rule is highly relevant to the 
straits issue: Where straight baselines drawn along an indented 
coast or . fringe of coastal islands have enclosed waters not 
previously regarded as internal, then a right of innocent passage 
applies to those waters as if they were part of the territorial 
sea (LOSC 1982: arti~le 8(2); TSC 1958: article 5(2)); if the 
internal waters happen to be in a strait used for international 
navigation, then under the 1982 convention transit passage may 
apply (LOSC 1982: article 35). Also relevant to the straits 
problem is the possible exception to the exception: when 
applying innocent passage or transit passage to newly enclosed 
internal waters, the conventions specifically refer to "the 
establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the 
method set forth in article 7 [in LOSC 1982 or article 4 in TSC 
1958]," permitting the argument that if the straight baselines 
are drawn under rules of customary international law, rather than 
pursuant to the conventions, innocent passage may not apply. The 
issue was not discussed by the International Court of Justice in 
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Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (1951), a case that helped to clarify 
the customary international law pertaining to straight baselines. 
In the internal waters of another state, foreign ships enjoy 
very few rights other than those granted by treaty. Other than 
ships in distress, foreign vessels have no right of access in 
customary international law to ports of another state. 
International ports are presumed to be open to foreign merchant 
ships, but a state may designate which of its ports are open, and 
there is no obligation to maintain any open ports at all. In 
practice, of course, ships enjoy broad rights to enter ports of 
other states under the hundreds of bilateral friendship, 
commerce, and navigation treaties and some international and 
regional conventions. If a state has granted a right of access 
to its ports, a right of exit is presumed, subject to the normal 
legal powers of the coastal state, which permit a state to seize 
a ship for the violation of customs, navigation, or pilotage laws 
or to arrest a vessel as security in a civil action or in an in 
rem action against the ship. A state may require vessels to 
obtain clearing papers, certifying that they have complied with 
customs and health requirements, and may detain unseaworthy 
vessels. Under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, a port state 
may institute legal proceedings against ships that have 
discharged pollutants into or even beyond the port state's 
internal waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone 
(articles 218, 220). 
There is also a right of access through internal waters to 
international rivers (those that form international boundaries 
or flow through more than one state) and canals, but, except for 
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ships of riparian states, it is generally thought that the rights 
derive solely from treaties, not from customary international law 
(Churchill and Lowe 1988:53-54). 
Despite a theoretical dispute on the extent of a port 
state's jurisdiction to enforce its laws aboard ships sailing 
under the flag of another state, state practice is quite 
consistent: Port states enforce their laws aboard ships of 
another state only when the port state's interests have been 
affected; matters affecting only the internal operations of the 
ship are left to enforcement by the flag state, through the 
master or the consul. A port state's interests have been found 
to have been affected, thus justifying intervention by the port 
state authorities, when its intervention is requested by the 
master or by the flag state's consul; when a non-member of the 
ship's complement is involved; when a national of the port state 
is involved; when a fugitive wanted by the police of the port 
state is aboard; and when the gravity of the offense is 
particularly great, as in the case of murder. ( Generally on 
internal waters, O'Connell 1982, chapter 9; Churchill and Lowe 
1988, chapter 3). 
3. Territorial Sea 
As its name suggests, the territorial sea is a part of the 
territory of the coastal state, under both customary and 
conventional international law. (LOSC 1982: article 2; TSC 
1958: article 1) Nevertheless, the sovereignty that a state 
exercises over its territorial sea is subject to the very 
i mportant right of innocent passage over those seas by ships of 
foreign states (LOSC 1982: articles 2(3), 17; TSC 1958: articles 
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1(2), 14). A coastal state's sovereignty extends to the air 
space above the territorial sea; this has long been recognized 
in customary and conventional international law, (LOSC 1982: 
article 2(2); TSC 1958: article 2; CICA article 2), but there 
is no right of innocent passage of aircraft through the airspace 
above the territorial sea (Hailbronner 1983:491; Moore 1980:85). 
A coastal state's sovereignty also extends to the seabed and 
subsoil under the territorial sea (LOSC 1982: article 2(2); TSC 
1958: article 2), but that is of little significance to this 
paper. 
There has never been universal agreement on the allowable 
breadth of the territorial sea, although it was fairly clear by 
the 1930s that states could claim up to three miles without 
challenge. In 1960, at the time of the Second United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II), nearly every state 
claimed a territorial sea of less than twelve miles, three miles 
being the most common claim. A few states claimed six miles, and 
the Scandinavian states continued to put forward their historic 
four-mile claims. By the end of UNCLOS III in 1982, the majority 
of states claimed at least 12 miles, and the 1982 convention 
recognizes this as the maximum allowable breadth (LOSC 1982: 
article 3). Several states, principally in Latin America, claim 
more, up to 200. miles, but these are not generally recognized 
other than between the states making such wider claims. 
Foreign ships have a right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea that has been recognized in customary 
international law since the concept of the territorial sea itself 
developed and in conventional law. (LOSC 1982: article 17; TSC 
15 
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1958: article 14) The definition of "passage" has broadened 
somewhat over the past sixty years but remains relatively 
uncontroversial. Under the 1958 convention, "passage" means 
navigation through the territorial sea for purposes of traversing 
it or proceeding to or from internal waters (article 14); the 
1982 convention extended the definition to include navigation to 
or from a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters 
(article 18(b)). Passage must be continuous and expeditious, but 
may include stopping and anchoring incidental to ordinary 
navigation or rendered necessary by force majeure or distress 
(LOSC 1982: article 18 ( 2); TSC 1958: article 14 ( 2), ( 2)). The 
1982 convention . also allows stopping . and anchoring for the 
purpose of rendering assistance to others in distress (article 
18(2)). 
The history of the meaning of . "innocent" has not been so 
straightforward. From the start, there was disagreement over 
whether innocence was to be determined by the manner of passage 
or by the ship's adherence to the laws of the coastal state. The 
1958 convention provided: "Passage is innocent so long as it is 
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State" (article 14(4)) and made no reference to adhering 
to the laws of the coastal state, with a single exception: 
"Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered 
innocent if they do not observe such laws a,nd regulations as the 
coastal State may make and publish in order to prevent these 
vessels from fishing in the territorial sea." (article 14(5)) 
The 1982 convention adopted the same general definition of 
innocent but substituted for the fishing vessels provision a list 
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of 12 activities to be considered prejudicial to the peace, good 
order, or security of the coastal state and thus rendering the 
passage not innocent. These include the threat or use of force 
against the coastal state; weapons exercises; collecting 
information prejudicial to the defense or security of the coastal 
state; propaganda; launching or taking on aircraft or military 
devices; violating the coastal state's customs, fiscal, 
immigration, or sanitary laws; fishing; research or surveying; 
interfering with the coastal state's communications; and finally 
and most broad, "any other activity not having a direct bearing 
on passage." ( article 19 ( 2)) This appears to have narrowed the 
right of innocent passage by allowing any activity "not having 
a direct bearing on passage" to render the passage not innocent, 
while under the 1958 convention only acts prejudicing the peace, 
good order, or security of the coastal state would do so. If a 
ship violates the rules relating to innocent passage, it becomes 
fully subject to all the laws of the coastal state and may be 
arrested for their violation or expelled from the territorial 
sea. 
A submarine in the territorial sea must navigate on the 
surface and show its flag (LOSC 1982: article 20; TSC 1958: 
article 14(6)), but beyond that, the innocent passage of warships 
has been a matter-of contention. The United States has recently, 
but not always, argued that the right of innocent passage extends 
to all ships, including warships. A number of states have 
contended that innocent passage does not extend to warships, and 
that they require authorization before entering the territorial 
sea. (Froman 1984:655) The Soviet Union filed a reservation to 
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that effect upon its ratification of the Territorial Sea 
Convention: 
The Government of the u.s.s.R. considers that a 
coastal State has the right to establish procedures 
for the authorization of the passage of foreign 
warships through its territorial waters. (TSC 1958) 
During UNCLOS III, . however, the Soviet Union, which had 
developed into a major maritime power, began to recognize a right 
of innocent passage for warships (Fr~nckx 1989a). By 1989, the 
dispute appeared to have been settled, as the United States and 
the Soviet Union exchanged notes confirming that both states 
recognized the right of innocent passage of warships, without 
prior authorization or notification. Although both states had 
held both positions at various times over a period of years, this 
agreement apparently marked the first time in history that they 
had been on the same side of the question at the same time. 
(Franckx 1990:485) The exchange of notes also confirmed that 
coastal states might not establish laws or regulations impairing 
innocent passage through the territorial sea, but that a coastal 
state might designate sea lanes and enforce traffic separation 
schemes when necessary to protect the safety of navigation. At 
the same time, the United States confirmed that it would refrain 
from exercising the right of innocent passage in the Soviet 
territorial sea in the Black Sea (Lowe 1991), as it had been 
doing as part of its freedom of navigation program. (Juda 1990) 
There continues a theoretical dispute over the extent of a 
coastal state's legislative competence in the territorial sea, 
but most of the practical difficulties resulting from the dispute 
are avoided either by judicious restraint on the part of coastal 
states or by the relatively clear restrictions on enforcement 
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jurisdiction in the 1958 and 1982 conventions. As to legislative 
competence, the 1982 convention has taken a restrictive view of 
the coastal state's prescriptive authority ovei ships passing 
through the territorial sea, listing specific categories of laws 
and regulations that the coastal state may adopt: navigational 
safety; protection of navigational aids, cables, and pipelines; 
conservation of living resources; environmental protection; 
scientific research; and preventing infringement of fisheries, 
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws (article 21). 
As to the coastal state's enforcement jurisdiction over 
crimes committed aboard a ship passing through the territorial 
sea, the 1982 convention takes a position reflecting the practice 
of port states in the enforcement of laws on foreign ships in 
internal waters: Enforce~ent should be exercised only when the 
consequences of the crime extend to the home state, it is the 
kind of crime that disturbs the peace of the country or the good 
order of the territorial sea, the coastal state's assistance has 
been requested by the ship's master or the flag state's consul, 
or drug trafficking is involved (article 27; TSC 1958: article 
19). Civil jurisdiction is treated analogously, providing that 
a coastal state should not stop or divert a ship to exercise 
civil jurisdiction over a person on board, and that it may not 
arrest or levy execution against a ship except for liabilities 
incurred by the ship in connection with that voyage through the 
coastal state's waters, unless the ship is in' the territorial sea 
having left the coastal state's internal waters (LOSC 1982: 
article 28; TSC 1958: article 20). These restrictions on the 
coastal states codify long-standing state practice based on 
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comity, and from them it may be inferred that the coastal state 
enjoys almost complete jurisdiction in the territorial sea 
subject to five exceptions: these codified rules of comity; a 
rule of nondiscrimination; jurisdiction over crimes committed 
before a ship entered the state's territorial sea; jurisdiction 
to arrest the ship in connection with liabilities unrelated to 
the present voyage through the territorial sea; and some 
limitations on enforcement jurisdiction over pollution (LOSC 
1982: article 220). 
A coastal state · has duties as well as rights in the 
territorial sea. It must give notice of known navigational 
hazards (Corfu Channel Case 1949; LOSC 1982: 24(2); TSC 1958: 
article 15(2)), and must provide lighthouses, rescue facilities, 
and other basic navigational services. 
Where the"presence of shipping would hamper the security of 
the state, a coastal state may suspend innocent passage 
temporarily in specified areas of the territorial sea (LOSC 1982: 
article 25(3); TSC 1958: article 16(3) ); this right of suspension 
is frequently exercised near naval dockyards, for example, and 
to allow for weapons exercises. 
When the territorial sea encompasses a strait used for 
international navigation, the rules of innocent passage may no 
longer apply. In -that situation, the Law of the Sea Convention 
has made a significant break from customary international law and 
the Territorial Sea Convention to impose the regime of transit 
passage, which is more favorable to maritime states and affords 
less jurisdiction to the coastal state . This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter III. (Generally on the territorial sea, 
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O'Connell 1982, chapters 3-5; Churchill and Lowe 1988: chapter 
4) 
4. Contiguous Zone 
Beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea, a coastal 
state may establish a zone for the enforcement of laws applicable 
to the territorial sea, that is to prevent or punish infringement 
in the territorial sea of customs, fiscal, immigration, or 
sanitary laws. The Territorial Sea Convention permits this 
contiguous zone to extend as far as 12 miles from the baselines 
(article 24), and the Law of the Sea Convention, reflecting the 
permissible extension of the Territorial Sea out to 12 miles, 
allows a contiguous zone out to 24 miles. 
Customary international law never settled on a permissible 
maximum breadth of the contiguous zone or on a limitation on the 
scope and type of jurisdiction exercisable within it. While the 
two conventions clearly contemplate enforcement jurisdiction 
only, so that the coastal state has no right to prosecute 
offenses that occur within the contiguous zone, a number of 
states, before and since the conventions, have claimed 
legislative jurisdiction in the contiguous zone, and some states 
have claimed jurisdiction to enforce interests not mentioned by 
the conventions, primarily security. 
Under cust-0mary international law and the Territorial Sea 
Convention, the contiguous zone was a part of the high seas, 
giving rise to a presumption against · a coastal state's 
jurisdiction over foreign ships. Under the Law of the Sea 
Convention, the contiguous zone is a part of the exclusive 
economic zone, in which no such presumption exists, a situation 
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that may .facilitate the extension of coastal state legislative 
jurisdiction into the contiguous zone. ( Generally on the 
contiguous zone, Churchill and Lowe 1988: chapter 7). 
5. Exclusive Economic Zone 
The exclusive economic zone extends up to two hundred miles 
from the baseline and enjoys its own legal regime, separate from 
that of the territorial sea and the high seas. In the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights over 
exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living and non-
living natural resources (LOSC 1982: article 56(1) (a)), and legal 
jurisdiction over marine scientific research, the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment, and the establishment and 
use of artificial islands, installations and structures (LOSC 
1982: article 56 ( 1) (b)). Other states have. freedom of navigation 
and overflight and of laying submarine cables and pipelines. 
In its present form, the exclusive economic zone was created 
by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and its roots go back only 
as far as 1945, the beginning of the current trend to extend 
coastal state jurisdiction over the sea and its resources. Its 
principal effect has been to give coastal states exclusive rights 
to the fish and hydrocarbons situated off their shores. Its 
primary relevance _to this paper is the jurisdiction granted to 
coastal states over the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. If the Northern Sea Route is - opened to foreign 
commercial shipping, the additional traffic is likely to threaten 
the delicate environment of the Arctic Ocean. Jurisdiction over 
the marine environment of the exclusive economic zone will enable 
the Soviet Union to regulate shipping beyond its territorial sea 
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in a way that probably would have been impermissible prior to the 
Law of the Sea Convention. Of special importance is article 234 
of the 1982 convention, which grants coastal states the right to 
enact and enforce special regulations for the control of marine 
pollution in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic 
zone, where the ecological balance is recognized as particularly 
sensitive. (Generally on the exclusive economic zone, O'Connell 
1982, chapter 15; Churchill and Lowe 1988, chapter 9) 
6. High Seas 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention defines the high seas as 
"all parts of the seas that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters 
of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic 
state." (article 86) On the high seas, every nation has the 
right to sail ships flying its flag (LOSC 1982: article 90; HSC 
1958: article 2), ahd no state may claim sovereignty over any 
part of them (LOSC 1982: article 89; HSC 1958: article 2). Among 
the freedoms of the high seas, the conventions explicitly 
guarantee navigation, overflight, laying submarine cables and 
pipelines, and fishing (LOSC 1982: article 87; HSC 1958: article 
2). The conventions make no effort to present an exhaustive list 
of freedoms; the presumption against state sovereignty on the 
high seas leaves states free to use the seas as they like, 
subject to a few restrictions and the general principle that the 
freedoms are to be exercised with due regard for the interests 
o f other states exercising their freedom of use (LOSC 1982: 
article 87; HSC 1958: article 2). 
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The basic rule is that the state under whose flag a ship is 
sailing has exclusive jurisdiction over the ship while it on the 
high seas, but there are several major exceptions under which 
states may exercise jurisdiction over ships of another state: 
ships suspected of piracy (LOSC 1982: articles 100-107; HSC 1958: 
articles 14-21), slave trading (LOSC 1982: article 99; HSC 1958: 
article 22(b)), drug trafficking (LOSC 1982: article 108), or 
unauthorized broadcasting (LOSC 1982: article 109). In fact, the 
conventions impose an obligation on states to cooperate in the 
suppression of these activities. A state may · also exercise 
jurisdiction on the high seas over ships of other nationalities 
to avoid pollution damage after a collision or other accident 
(LOSC 1982: article 221), and may pursue onto the high seas ships 
that have violated its laws in its territorial sea (LOSC 1982: 
article 111; HSC 1958: article 23). (Generally on the high seas, 
Churchill and Lowe 1988: chapter 11) 
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III. The Legal Regime of International Straits 
Whether as refuges or as sea paths for his ships, 
straits have ever attracted the profit-seeking eyes of 
man. 
P.P. Graves (1931:13) 
Since early in the nineteenth century, when the major 
maritime powers recognized the value of freedom of navigation on 
the high seas, the major straits of the world have been kept open 
to free navigation, first through a series of bilateral and 
multi-lateral agreements and, more recently, through customary 
international law developing out · of the treaties. (Anand 
1983: 181-183) This regime remained reasonably stable until about 
the 1960s. By 1973, when UNCLOS III began, four major issues had 
emerged that threatened the continued viability of the customary 
straits regime as codified by the 1958 Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the. Contiguous Zone (TSC 1958): the growing 
number of states claiming 12-mile territorial seas instead of the 
traditional three miles; the question of whether warships enjoyed 
a right of innocent passage; the interest of states bordering 
straits in the safety of navigation and in protecting their 
waters from pollution; and uncertainty as to the precise content 
of the right of innocent passage, upon which depended the 
authority of a state to bar foreign ships from transiting a 
strait bordering its coast. (Koh 1982:3) 
A. The Importance of Straits 
As UNCLOS III opened, the line was fairly clearly drawn . 
On one side were the straits states, many of them developing 
countries, and their claims to jurisdiction to regulate and even 
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prohibit passage; on the other, the maritime powers and their 
insistence on keeping the straits open . . Despite the military and 
economic edge held by the major powers generally, the geographic 
situation of straits, which are confined and often shallow, gives 
the states bordering a major advantage in the enforcement of 
rules (Morris 1987: 460), and in the event of a dispute over 
access to a strait, it is often cheaper to take a longer route 
than to negotiate or force passage. (McGwire 1977) w ·h i 1 e 
there has been some suggestion in the legal and political 
literature of the maritime powers that straits are no longer of 
paramount importance to national security (Darman 1978; Osgood 
1976:48), the more prevalent view is that they are still of 
fundamental importance and likely to remain so. (Moore 1980; 
Reisman 1980) Reisman encapsulated the latter view in his 1980 
article on the negotiations over the straits regime: 
An acceptable public order of the oceans as it 
pertains to security should provide for wide surface 
and aerial access and rights of submerged passage as 
unconditionally as possible." (Reisman 1980:53) 
Indeed, as early as 1970, before UNCLOS III opened, the 
president of the United States had outlined a new oceans policy 
recognizing the inevitability of the 12-mile territorial sea and 
stressing the importance of straits to a variety of interests: 
It is equally important to assure unfettered and 
harmonious use - of the oceans as an avenue of commerce 
and transportation, and as a source of food. For this 
reason the United States is currently engaged with 
other states in an effort to obtain a new law of the 
sea treaty. This treaty would establis'h a 12-mile 
limit for territorial seas and provide for free 
transit through international straits. (Nixon 
1970:678) 
As to the undeniable interest of the straits states in 
regulating the use of the waters off their coasts, McDougal and 
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Burke argue that "there appears no coastal interest of sufficient 
gravity to merit authorizing the coastal state to deny all 
passage through a strait, except in times of the highest 
expectations of violence." They say that limiting a coastal 
state's authority to precluding passage for a specified cause 
will tend to prevent a state from controlling a strait "as a 
means of projecting its influence for purposes of special 
national policy ••• rather than as protection against prejudice 
from passage." (McDougal and Burke 1987:189) 
B. The Development of the Law 
Before the 1960s, when the three-mile territorial sea was 
more or less standard, ships of all nations enjoyed the freedom 
of the high seas through any strait more than six miles wide 
measured between the baselines. As it happened, this included 
nearly all of the important straits, so that Westlake was able 
to write in 1904 that straits needed to be considered in 
international law only to the extent that their widths were not 
more than twice that of a coastal state's territorial sea (or the 
aggregate widths of both territorial seas if the strait is 
bounded by opposing states). (Westlake 1904:193) Today, under 
·Westlake' s formula, straits are more important than ever in 
international law, for as territorial seas have grown wider, 
fewer and fewer straits reach the critical width, so it is upon 
international law that the maritime states' ~epend for access to 
them. 
When coastal states in large numbers began declaring 
territorial seas of 12 miles, in some cases more, the principal 
resistance to these claims came from maritime states concerned 
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that straits of less than 24 miles' breadth would be removed from 
the legal regime of the high seas. One study found that 116 
international straits would be enclosed by a world-wide adoption 
of the 12-mile territorial sea. (Office of the Geographer 1974) 
This would have relegated foreign ·ships in these straits to the 
right of innocent passage, which is not only restrictive of 
ships' movements and activities, but is also susceptible to 
suspension by the coastal state. (Koh 1982:3-6) It would also 
have eliminated the right of overflight, as there is no right of 
innocent passage for aircraft above the territorial sea 
(Hailbronner 1983:491; Moore 1980:85), and would have required 
transiting submarines to surface and to show the flag. (TSC 1958: 
article 14 ( 6) ) Perhaps just as serious, from the maritime 
states' perspective, was the concurrent increase in the 
employment of straight baselines, which had the ef feet of 
enclosing as internal waters some straits used for international 
navigation; under the customary regime for internal waters, these 
straits would have been al together inaccessible to foreign 
vessels without the authorization of the coastal state. 
Before UNCLOS III, the legal regime of international straits 
running through the territorial sea was ambiguous, as to both the 
content of the right of passage through them and the question of 
which straits ft affected. O'Connell regarded the regime of 
straits as an autonomous institution, neither high seas nor 
territorial sea but somewhere in between. He found that the 
choice of route and the scope of permissible behavior were more 
restricted than on the high seas but greater than in the 
territorial sea (O'Connell 1982: 327) ~ Churchill and Lowe, on the 
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other hand, find that, despite some disagreement on the content 
of the right, "the balance of juristic opinion seems to favour 
the conclusion that customary law accords only a nonsuspendable 
right of innocent passage through them." (Churchill and Lowe 
1988:89) Whatever the content of the right, there appears to be 
no doubt that the coastal state was prohibited from suspending 
it; this is a fundamental rule of customary international law 
(Corfu Channel 1949:29) that was embodied in the Territorial Sea 
Convention: 
There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage 
of foreign ships through straits which are used for 
international navigation between one part of the high 
seas and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial sea of a foreign State. (1958: article 
16 ( 4) ) 
1. The Corfu Channel Case 
Corfu Channel is a central case in the history of the 
straits regime, and some familiarity with it is crucial to an 
understanding of the regime's development. The dispute leading 
to it began on 15 May 1946, when Albanian shore batteries opened 
fire on two British cruisers passing through the Corfu Channel 
between Albania and the Greek island of Corfu. The British 
government protested strongly what it regarded as a breach of the 
international right of passage of vessels, including warships, 
through straits used by international shipping. On 22 October, 
a British squadron, cleared for action but with the guns in the 
normal stowage position, proceeded through the north Corfu 
Channel. Two of the ships struck mines and were seriously 
damaged, with the loss of 44 lives . The British government 
announced that it intended to sweep the passage for mines and , 
despite Albanian protests , did so , detecting 2 2 mines and 
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destroying 20. An inspection of the two others revealed evidence 
strongly suggesting Albanian responsibility. 
The United Kingdom, seeking compensation for the ships and 
the loss of life, referred the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice, which, after some procedural disagreement, accepted 
jurisdiction. The United Kingdom alleged that the Albanian 
government either had caused the mines to be laid in the channel 
or was aware of their existence in a channel known by the 
Albanian government to be used by shipping of other states. The 
United Kingdom argued that Corfu Channel, because it was a 
natural channel between two parts of the high seas, was an 
international highway subject to a right of innocent passage. 
Albania denied laying the mines and responded that Corfu Channel 
was not an international strait but a means of lateral traffic 
of secondary and limited importance. It justified its refusal 
of passage to the British ships on the grounds that the channel 
was the frontier between Albania and Greece, which regarded 
itself as being in a state of war with Albania, and that national 
security was a consideration in establishing rights of passage. 
By special agreement of the parties, the International Court 
had two principal questions to answer: (1) Was Albania 
responsible for the explosions? and (2) Did the United Kingdom 
violate Albania's - sovereignty on October 22 and during the 
minesweeping operations? The answer to the first question, which 
went against Albania, is of little significance to this paper, 
but the answer to the second forms the core of most discussion 
of international straits since 1949. The International Court 
held that under customary international law 
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States in time of peace have a right to send their 
warships through straits used for international 
navigation between two parts of the high seas without 
the previous authorization of a coastal State, 
provided that the passage is innocent. Unless 
otherwise prescribed in international convention there 
is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such 
passage through straits in time of peace. ( Corfu 
Channel 1949:28) 
The court noted the heightened tensions along the Albania-
Greece frontier, and said that 
Albania, in view of these exceptional circumstances, 
would have been justified in issuing regulations in 
respect of the passage of warships through the strait, but not in prohibiting such passage or in subjecting 
it to the requirement of special authorisation. (Corfu Channel 1958:29) 
A determination of Britain's right to traverse the channel 
and to conduct minesweeping operations there thus required two 
factual determinations: whether Corfu Channel was a strait "used 
for international navigation" within the meaning of the court's 
statement of the law, and whether Britain's activities there --
the October 22 transit and the subsequent minesweeping operations 
were innocent. 
Albania argued that Corfu Channel was not an international 
strait but merely an alternative route of secondary importance 
between the Aegean and Adriatic Seas, used almost exclusively by 
local traffic, and thus not subject to the passage regime 
articulated by .the court. The court, however, found this to be 
sufficient to qualify the channel as an international strait, the 
decisive criteria being ( 1) its geographical situati~n as a 
strait connecting two parts of the high seas, and (2) the fact 
that it was actually used for international navigation. The 
actual volume of international traffic through the strait was not 
relevant to its legal status. 
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As to the innocence of · the British activities in the 
channel, the court's formulation of the law had made clear that 
the vessels' being warships did not ipso facto disqualify them 
from innocent passage. A determination of innocence, then, 
depended upon the facts of each incident. As to the passage of 
22 October, the evidence showed that the ships were not in combat 
formation; further, the fact that the purpose of the passage was 
to challenge the Albanian government's attempt to close the 
channel to British warships did not render it not innocent. What 
governed innocence was not the purpose of the voyage but the 
manner in which it was carried out. 
The minesweeping operations, however, were found not to be 
within the ambit of innocent passage. Further, the court 
rejected the British defense of extreme urgency, noting that the 
sort of intervention in which the British had engaged would "in 
the nature of things • • • be reserved for the most powerful 
States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration 
of international justice itself." (Corfu Channel 1949:33) 
While Corfu Channel is interesting in a number of respects, 
its great significance is in the exposition of the law relating 
to innocent passage through international straits and in its 
application of the factors that qualify a strait as 
international: ~1) its geographical situation and (2) its use in 
international navigation. Since 1949, those factors have been 
the focus of much discussion, and they have subsequently been 
modified by convention. 
Chapter VI. 
They are discussed in more detail in 
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2. Unresolved Issues 
Even after Corfu Channel, a number of major questions were 
left unresolved. For example, there has never been a precise 
determination of the rules of innocent passage that would allow 
a neutral observer to render an objective judgment as to the 
innocence vel non of a particular passage. (Maduro 1980:73) 
Further, despite the clear judgment of the International Court 
that innocent passage applied to warships, this immediately 
became a point of contention. The International Law Commission 
concluded that passage of warships through any territorial sea, 
including international straits, would require either 
"authorization or notification." The question was not resolved 
explicitly by the 1958 convention. While both questions are of 
significance to the Arctic straits, neither bears directly on 
their legal status if they are used for international navigation. 
c. International Straits in the 1982 Convention 
Two tasks, broadly speaking, faced UNCLOS III: attempting 
to clarify issues left outstanding by Corfu Channel, the 1958 
conventions, and state practice, and attempting to resolve new 
conflicts raised by "creeping jurisdiction." By and large, they 
succeeded in striking a balance between the security needs of the 
straits states and the mobility requirements of the maritime 
powers. (Grunawalt 1987:452) 
To help clarify the meaning of innocent passage, the 1982 
convention retained the rule that passage is not innocent if 
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State," but added a list of twelve categories of activities 
considered to be prejudicial. (article 19) As there is no 
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indication that the list is to be taken as exhaustive, it is 
unlikely that the list can resolve all ambiguity. As for the 
warships problem, the 1982 convention grants the right of transit 
passage to "all ships and aircraft," (article 38(1)) a phrase 
that Moore describes as "wholly inconsistent with any 
differentiation on the basis of the military or commercial nature 
of the vessel or aircraft." (1980:110) Nevertheless, the 
passage of warships continued to be an issue and, as between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, was not resolved until 1989. 
(Lowe 1991) 
The drafters attempted to resolve the "creeping 
jurisdiction" dispute by creating a new right of transit passage. 
Unknown in customary international law and cre a t ed by the 1982 
convention, transit passage is the outstanding characteristic of 
the regime for international straits established by Part III of 
the convention. Negotiated as a part of a package including 
recognition of the 12-mile territorial sea, it represents a 
compromise between the interests of the maritime states in 
unfettered freedom of navigation through international straits 
and the interests of the coastal states in protecting their 
waters from collisions and pollution (Reisman 1980) . The regime 
assures access to straits enclosed by expanded territorial seas 
and i nternal waters, and transit passage is far more favorable 
to maritime states than is the relatively restrictiv e innocent 
passa ge . (Robertson 1980:812 ) 
1. The Right of Trans i t Pa ssage 
Transit passage "me ans the exercise ••• o f t he f r eedom of 
navigation a nd overflight s olely f or t he purpose o f c ont i nuous 
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and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas on an exclusive economic zone." (article 38(2)) It 
differs significantly . from innocent passage in that: ( 1) it 
applies to overflights by aircraft as well as to navigation 
(id.); (2) it may not be hampered or suspended (article 44); and 
(3) there are no criteria of innocence to be met, although ships 
or aircraft must proceed through or over the strait without delay 
( article 39 ( 1) (a) ) , refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the coastal state (article 39(1)(b)), and refrain from 
any activity other than those incident to their normal modes of 
continuous and expeditious transit (article 39(l)(c)); any other 
activity "remains subject to the other applicable provisions" of 
the convention (article 38(3)), which presumably means that the 
rules of innocent passage take effect when a vessel engages in 
any unauthorized activity, permitting the coastal state to bar 
the vessel or to assume jurisdiction over the of fending behavior. 
In addition, by reference to "normal modes" of transit, article 
39(1)(c)) apparently permits submarines to transit submerged. 
Reisman (1980:71-75) and others have argued that this is not 
unambiguous, but Moore finds that the convention's text 
undeniably establishes the right of submerged transit through 
straits. (Moore· 1980: 95-102) 
Transit passage affords to the coastal state significantly 
more jurisdiction over foreign vessels than do the rules 
governing freedom of the high seas or exclusive economic zones 
but significantly less than over vessels in inn6cent passage. 
(Moore 1980:105) Coastal states may designate sea lanes and 
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prescribe traffic separation schemes for safety reasons (article 
41 ( 1)) and may adopt laws and regulations regarding maritime 
safety and traffic (article 42(l)(a)); the prevention of fishing 
( article 42 ( 1) ( c) ) ; loading or unloading in violation of customs, 
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws (article 42 (l)(d)); and 
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution but only by 
giving effect to existing international regulations. 
2. Conditions for Applying Transit Passage 
The 1982 convention applies the right of transit passage to 
"straits which are used for internationa1 navigation between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." (Article 
37). It, however, expressly exempts from the regime of 
international straits the following areas: 
1. internal waters within a strait, except where waters not 
previously considered internal waters have been enclosed by 
straight baselines pursuant to article 7 (article 35(a)); 
2. waters of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone 
(article 35(b)); 
3. straits in which passage is regulated by long-standing 
international conventions (article 35(c)); and 
4. straits through which there exists, in the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone, a route of similar convenience with 
respect to navigational and hydrological characteristics ( article 
36). 
The convention also exempts from the right of transit 
passage (but not from the overall regime of international 
straits) 
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5. a strait between the mainland and an island of a state 
if , seaward of the island, there exists through the high seas or 
an exclusive economic zone a route of similar convenience with 
respect t o navigational and hydrological characteristics ( article 
38 ( 1) ) • In this case, a regime of nonsuspendable innocent 
passage applies to the strait (article 45(l)(a),(2)). 
3. Nonsuspendable Innocent Passage 
In two instances, straits used for international navigation 
will be subject to a nonsuspendable right of innocent passage, 
rather than transit passage: when a strait between an island and 
the mainland is excluded from the transit passage regime under 
article 38(1) because of a high seas route of similar convenience 
seaward of the island (LOSC 1982: article 45(l)(a)(2) ), and when 
the strait connects a part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone not with another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone but with the territorial sea of a foreign 
state (LOSC 1982: article 45(l)(b)(2)). As to the first 
instance, there are a significant number of examples of Soviet 
Arctic straits lying between islands and the mainland , so the 
question of a seaward route of similar convenience is highly 
relevant. There are no examples of the second instance, however , 
as the entire Northern Sea Route, as it traverses the Northeast 
Passage , lies within Soviet internal waters , territorial sea , or 
exclusive economic zone, so that non~ of its straits leads to the 
t erritorial sea of another state . 
A regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, closely 
analogous to that of transit passage, has been establi she d to 
govern the r i ghts o f archi pela gic states to encl o s e the ir waters 
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with straight baselines while allowing foreign ships relatively 
unobstructed access to sea lanes through and air routes over the 
archipelagos (articles 46-54). This regime has no relevance to 
the Norther n Sea Route, as there are no archipelagic states in 
its vicinity, and will not be discuss·ed further. There are major 
archipelagos in the Soviet Arctic, and the status of their waters 
is an issue, but they are not subject to the archipelagic states 
regime of the 1982 convention, which is restricted to states 
"constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos " (article 
46(a)) (emphasis added) (Scovazzi 1988:38 fn.3) 
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IV. The Straits of the Northern Sea Route 
The legal regime applicable to a particular strait depends 
largely upon the classification of the waters in which the strait 
is situated, the classification of the waters that it joins, and 
whether or not the strait is "used for international navigation." 
A strait's being used for international navigation gives rise to 
the possibility that transit passage will apply. 
This section identifies each of the straits that is or might 
become essential to navigation through the Northeast Arctic 
Passage and describes the characteristics relevant to its legal 
status: the maritime zone in which it lies; its width, which 
determines whether it is capable of including a high seas or 
exclusive economic zone route of similar convenience; if it 
separates an island from the mainland, whether there is a seaward 
route of · similar convenience through the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone; and other basic data of interest such 
as length, depth, and typical ice conditions. 
The straits described are among those identified by Butler 
as pos-ibly essential to transit the Northeast Arctic Passage or 
possibly becoming essential under certain conditions. (1978:38-
41) (The word "essential" is not used here with a legal 
connotation, inasmuch as the importance of a strait to 
international navigation is no longer a factor in determining its 
legal status; in this context it is intended simply as a 
predictor of whether the strait will , in fact, be used for 
international navigation.) 
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Obviously the most important of the straits listed here are 
those linking the seas, as they constitute "choke points," where 
the choice of route is at its absolute minimum. Many of the 
others may appear to be too small or out of the way ever to prove 
useful to ships plying the Northern Sea Route, but the 
unpredictable nature of sea ice often forces vessels onto 
unanticipated routes. 
Barents Sea 
1. Proliv Kil'dinskiy (Kil'din Strait) (69° 20' N, 33° 59' 
E), 4~ cables wide, 10 miles long, and deep in the fairway, is 
situated between the mainland and Ostrov Kil'din, the largest 
island off the Murmansk coast. It never freezes, but is sometimes 
completely blocked by ice carried in by tidal currents. The 
strait is enclosed by straight baselines that enclose the island 
and thus constitutes internal waters, but it appears to be 
subject to no claim of historic strait. Whether the seaward 
route is of similar convenience varies with the ice conditions, 
especially because the water in the strait never freezes. (White 
Sea Pilot, p. 58) 
2. Proliv Nikol'skiy Shar (70° 30' N, 57° 13' E), ~-mile 
wide and 10 miles long. It lies between Ostrov Kusova Zemlya, 
a small island at the southwestern corner of the northwestern 
coast of Proliv Karskiye Vorota (Kara Gates Strait) and 
Poluostrov Piritovyy on Novaya Zemlya. It is within the straight 
baselines that enclose Novaya Zemlya. (Arctic Pilot 3.125) 
3. Proliv Kostin Shar (70° 52' n, 53° 21' E), 6 cables wide 
and 55 miles long, separates the east and north sides of Ostrov 
Mezhdusharskiy from Novaya Zemlya. It is within the straight 
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baselines that enclose Novaya Zemlya. The bay in which the 
island and the strait lie has too wide an entrance (about 45 
miles) to be entirely closed under the conventional rules for 
closing bays, there is no evidence that the bay has been claimed 
as historic waters, and, in light of the straight baselines 
enclosing the entire archipelago, there is at present no reason 
for the Soviet Union to draw a bay closing line. (Arctic Pilot 
4.10) 
4. & 5. Proliv Krotova, 1-3/4 miles wide, and Proliv 
Kazakova, 2-3/4 miles wide, are deep, and clear of dangers in the 
fairway. They divide Ostrov Mityushev (73° 26' N, 54° 6' E) from 
Novaya Zemlya, and are within the straight baselines. (Arctic 
Pilot 6.12) 
6. Proliv Shirokiy (71° 18' N, 53° 15' E), 3~ cables wide, 
lies between Ostrov Timofeyeva and Ostrov Sobachiy in Proliv 
Kostin Shar. It is within the straight baselines that enclose 
Proliv Kostin Shar. (Arctic Pilot 4.70) 
7. Proliv Uzkiy (71° 19' N, 53° 21' E), 5~ cables wide, 25 
to 50 meters deep in the fairway, separates Ostrov Sobachiy from 
Novaya Zeritlya and from Ostrov Ter-Tyre in Proliv Kostin Shar and 
is within the straight baselines that enclose Proliv Kostin Shar. 
(Arctic Pilot 4.62) 
White Sea 
The White Sea is a large bay opening into the Barents Sea 
between Poluostrov Kol' skiy ( Kola Peninsula) and Poluostrov 
Kanin. Its entrance is 8 4. 4 miles wide measured along the 
closing line that runs between Mys Sviatoy Nos and Mys Kanin Nos. 
It contains a number of significant straits , in particular the 
4 1 
Gorlo, which varies in width between 25 and 50 miles and joins 
the northern and southern basins. It is the only passage between 
the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean and thus an indispensable 
route for vessels serving White Sea ports. In addition, Butler 
identifies six other straits in th~ White Sea as essential or 
conditionally essential to transit the Northeast Arctic Passage. 
Nevertheless, this paper does not survey the straits of the 
White Sea, for two reasons. First, the Northern Sea Route 
Project appears to contemplate the foreign use of the Northern 
Sea Route as a transport route between northern Europe and 
northern Pacific ports. Ships plying this route will pass by the 
entrance to the White Sea but will not enter. 
Second, the closing line renders all the waters of the White 
Sea internal waters. Because the line was drawn as the closing 
line to a historic bay (Decree of 1985), and not as a straight 
baseline under article 7 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
( or article 4 of the 19 5 8 Territorial Sea Convention) , the 
exceptions of articles 35(a) (transit passage) and 8(a) (innocent 
passage) in the 1982 convention and of article 5(a) (innocent 
passage) in the 1958 convention do not apply; all the straits of 
the White Sea are thus exempt from the innocent passage and 
transit passage regimes. Furthermore, as a result, the waters 
on each end of all the straits are internal waters, not high seas 
or exclusive economic zone, so the straits do not meet the 
section 37 condition for transit passage. While international 
objection . has been made to the Soviet baselines, it seems 
unlikely that the White Sea closing line will not be eventually 
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accepted; the White Sea straits, therefore, will not be described 
further. 
Linking Barents and Kara Seas 
Three straits connect the Barents and Kara Seas. The only 
other route between the seas is around the north tip of Novaya 
zemlya, which is occasionally necessary, when all three straits 
are obstructed by ice. Sometimes, but rarely, all four routes 
are closed. All three straits, along with the whole of Novaya 
zemlya and Ostrov Vaygach, have been enclosed by straight 
baselines, so they constitute internal waters, but probably not 
to the exclusion of transit passage. 
8. Proliv Yugorskiy Shar, 5~ miles wide, about 21 miles long 
and at least 12 meters deep in the fairway, lies between Ostrov 
Vaygach and Poluostrov Yugorskiy on the mainland. The southwest 
entrance is between Mys Belyy Nos (69° 36' N, 60° 11' E) and Mys 
Greben', 5~ miles to the northwest. The northeast entrance is 
between Mys Yarossel' (60° 51' N, 60° 47' E) and Mys Belyy, 7~ 
miles west by northwest. It is the most convenient of the three 
straits linking the Barents and Kara Seas. Though the strait 
lies between an island and the mainland, the Novaya Zemlya 
archipelago precludes a seaward route of similar convenience. 
It is fully enclosed by the straight baselines that enclose 
Novaya Zemlya, but at each end, beyond the 12-mile territorial 
sea extending from the baselines, is exclusive economic zone, of 
the Barents Sea to the Southwest and of the Kara Sea to the 
northeast. (Arctic Pilot 2.32) 
9. Proliv Karskiye Vorota (Kara Gates Strait) (70° 30' N, 
58° 00' E), lies between Ostrov Vaygach and Novaya Zemlya. The 
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depths are very irregular, but in the fairway it is deep enough 
to make anchoring difficult. It is enclosed by straight 
baselines of 29 miles on the southwest and 32 miles on the 
northeast, suggesting that the exclusive economic zone would run 
through it if it were not enclosed; large numbers of islets along 
both sides of the strait reduce the fairway to a width of 13~ 
miles, however, and if each islet were assigned it own baselines, 
it is likely that the territorial seas would overlap, eliminating 
the exclusive economic zone. Like Proliv Yugorskiy Shar, it is 
in internal waters with exclusive economic zone at each end 
(beyond the 12-mile territorial sea). (Arctic Pilot 2.68) 
10. Proliv Matochkin Shar (73° 20' N, 54° 00' E), ~-mile 
wide, 55 miles long, and at least 11. 9 meters deep in the 
fairway, divides Novaya Zemlya in two, about 155 miles from 
Proliv Karskiye Vorota (Kara Gates Strait) at the south end. 
When ice conditions permit, vessels of any size can pass through. 
Like the other two inter-sea straits, it is in internal waters 
with exclusive economic zone at each end, beyond the territorial 
sea. (Arctic Pilot 5.1) 
Kara Sea 
There are thousands of islands in the Kara Sea, but only 
twenty of the straits have been identified as significant to 
navigation. 
11. Proliv Petukhovskiy Shar, 2 to 3 cables wide and 5~ 
miles long, is between Ostrov Bol'shoy Olynyi and the southern 
side of Novaya Zemlya's Poluostrov Rusanov (70° 34' N, 56° 21' 
E) . It is deep enough only for small vessels drawing four to six 
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feet. It is enclosed by the straight baselines along Novaya 
zemlya's indented coastline. (Arctic Pilot 3.96) 
12. Proliv Morozova, ~ mile wide, separates the southeastern 
end of Ostrov Mestnyy (69° 51' N, 61° 14' E) from Mys Tonkiy, on 
the mainland. It is enclosed by straight baselines that end on 
the island. The convenience of a seaward route depends upon ice 
conditions. (Arctic Pilot 9.19) 
13. Proliv Sharapov Shar, a narrow passage, 0.6 to 0.9 
meters deep, lies between the mainland and Sharapovy Koshki, a 
chain of sandy spits extending from Mys Porny-Salya (70° 26' N, 
66° 59' E) about 40 miles north to Mys Kharasovoy. It is a 
textbook case for the argument that there can be no seaward route 
of similar convenience: Depths range between 2-3/4 and 9 fathoms 
about 15 miles to the seaward, but vessels use the channel 
despite its shallowness when forced by ice to navigate close to 
the shore. It lies partly within straight baselines and partly 
behind Sharapovy Koshki, which has natural baselines. (Arctic 
Pilot 9.97) 
14. Proliv Malygina, 4~ miles wide and 32 miles long, lies 
between Ostrov Belyy (White Island) (73° 15' N, 70° 45' E) and 
Poluostrov Yamal. Depths are subject to frequent change, but a 
light draft vessel can save 50 miles by not having to pass north 
of the island, a ·route frequently blocked by ice while the strait 
is clear, mitigating against a convenient seaward route. The 
strait is entirely enclosed by straight baselines enclosing 
Ostrov Belyy. (Arctic Pilot 10.17) 
15. Proliv Ovtsyna (72° 35' N, 78° 40' E), 22 miles wide and 
3~ to 6~ fathoms in the middle, separates Ostrov Kuz'nin (also 
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called Ostrov Sibiryakova) and Ostrov Oleniy. It is a principal 
ship channel to the Reka Yenisey (Yenisey River) and is within 
the straight baselines that enclose the mouth of the river. 
(Arctic Pilot 11.167) 
16. Proliv Krestovskiy, 1 mile wide and 10 meters deep in 
the fairway, separates Ostrov Krestovskiy Island (72° 26' N, 80° 
46' E) from the Reka Yenisey (Yenisey River) and is within the 
straight baselines that enclose the mouth of the river. Any 
seaward route will likewise be within the straight baselines and 
thus not in the high seas or exclusive economic zone. (Arctic 
Pilot 11.236) 
17. Proliv Matisena lies between Ostrov Pilota Makhotkina 
(76° 22' N, 96° 55' E) and Arkhipelag Nordenshel'da (Nordenskjold 
Archipelago), a group of about seventy islands. The strait, 
which has not been surveyed, is 12 to 18 meters deep in the 
fairway. It is within the straight baselines that enclose the 
archipelago. (Arctic Pilot 14.76) 
18. Proliv Frama (Fram Strait), 1\ miles wide and generally 
deep but less than 11 meters at points, separates the south side 
of Ostrov Nansena (Nansen Island) (76° 12' N, 94° 57' E) from 
Poluostrov Yeremeyeva on the mainland. It is well within the 
straight baselines that enclose Arkhipelag Nordenshel'da to the 
north, so the seaward route is in internal waters. (Arctic Pilot 
14.26) 
19. Proliv Sverdrup, not surveyed but ' known to be deep and 
clear of known dangers in the fairway, lies between Ostrov 
Nansena and Ostrov Bonevy ( 7 6 ° 10' N, 95 ° 00' E) . It lies 
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within the straight baselines of Arkhipelag Nordenshel 'da. 
(Arctic Pilot 14.30) 
20. Proliv Zarya (76° 10' N, 95° OO'E), 1~ miles wide and 
10 to 15 meters deep in the fairway, lies between Ostrov Bonevy 
and the mainland, but Ostrov Nanseria and Ostrov Taymyr cut it off 
from any possible seaward route of similar convenience. It lies 
within the straight baselines of Arkhipelag Nordenshel 'da. 
(Arctic Pilot 14.32) 
21. Proliv Palander, 2\ miles wide and 38 to 49 meters deep 
in the fairway, separates Ostrov Bonevy and Ostrov Nansena on the 
west and Ostrov Taymyr (76° 17' N, 95° 22' E) on the east. It 
lies within the straight baselines of the Arkhipelag 
Nordenshel'da. (Arctic Pilot 14.41) 
22. Proliv Toros (76° 19' N, 96° 29' E), unexamined but 
known to be about 16 miles long and 1 to 2 miles wide with depths 
of about 20 meters, separates Ostrov Taymyr and Ostrov Pilota 
Makhotkina from Ostrov Moiseyev and Ostrov Pilota Alekseyeva. 
It lies within the straight baselines of the Arkhipelag 
Nordenshel'da. (Arctic Pilot 14.64) 
23. Proliv Vostochnyy, 1 mile wide, 6 miles long, and at 
least 8. 8 meters in the . fairway, lies between Ostrov Pilota 
Makhotkina and Mys Kamen' (76° 17' N, 96° 44' E), the northeast 
extremity of Ostrov Taymyr. It is well within the straight 
baselines that enclose the Arkhipelag Nordenshel 'da to the north, 
so the seaward route is in internal waters. (Arctic Pilot 14.68) 
Dikson Island Straits (in the Kara Sea) 
Ostrov Dikson (Dikson Island), the largest member of an 
archipelago lying southwest of Mys Severo-Vostochnyy (Cape 
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southeast), is a key port of call for ships plying the Northern 
sea Route in either direction, for vessels bound from European 
Russian ports to Siberian seaports and rivers, and for river 
steamers from Krasnoyasrsk and Igarka. It is separated from the 
mainland by three straits Proliv Lena, Proliv Preven, and 
Proliv Vega -- named for the vessels in which A.E. Nordenskjold 
made the first successful transit of the Northeast Passage in 
1878-79. 
24. Proliv Lena (73° 31' N, 80° 28' E), 1 cable wide and 2.1 
meters deep, lies between the north side of Dikson Island and the 
mainland. It is within the straight baselines that enclose the 
mouth of Reka Yenisey (Yenisey River) but as one of the points 
lies on Ostrov Dikson, there is a seaward route; its convenience 
depends on ice conditions. Its seaward end leads to the 
territorial s·ea, which abuts the exclusive economic zone, but its 
southern end leads to internal waters. (Arctic Pilot 11.147) 
25. Proliv Preven (73° 31' N, 80° 30' E), 15.8 meters deep 
in the fairway, lies between Ostrova Nordenshel'da, a group of 
three islets, and the mainland and is the northern entrance to 
Gavan' Dikson, the harbor and anchorage area between Ostrov 
Dikson and the mainland to the east. As with Proliv Lena, it is 
within the straight baselines that enclose the mouth of Reka 
Yenisey, but as _one of the points lies on Ostrov Dikson, there 
is a seaward route; its convenience depends on ice conditions. 
(Arctic Pilot 11.146) 
26 . Proliv Vega (73° 28' N, 80° 290' E), at least 10 meters 
deep in the deepest channel , is the southern entrance to Gavan ' 
Dikson. As are Proliv Lena and Proliv Preven, it is within the 
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straight baselines that enclose the mouth of Reka Yenisey, but 
as one of the points lies on Ostrov Dikson, there is a seaward 
route; its convenience depends on ice conditions. The south end 
of the strait leads to internal waters. (Arctic Pilot 11.142) 
Shkhery Minina (Minin Skerries) (in the Kara Sea) 
Shkhery Minina consists of an archipelago comprising three 
main groups of islands: Ostrova Plavnikovyy ( Plavnikov Islands), 
a central group, and a northeastern group. They are all enclosed 
by straight baselines. (Arctic Pilot 13.85) 
27. Proliv Dubravina (74° 24' N, 85° 12' E), 2 miles wide 
and 20 to 26 meters deep in the fairway, separates Ostrov 
Kosterina from Ostrov Severnyy Zarzar (Northern Karzar Island). 
(Arctic Pilot 13.121) 
28. Proliv Glubokiy (74° 26' N, 85° 41' E) is narrow and 10 
to 13 meters deep in the fairway. It lies between Ostrov 
Kosterina, Ostrov Kruglyy, and Ostrov Granitnyy on the west and 
Ostrov Pestsovyy on the east. (Arctic Pilot 13.123) 
29. Proliv Stalintsa (Stalinets Strait), 7 cables wide and 
at least 11 meters deep, separates the northeastern group, 
including Ostrov Kolosovykh (74° 55' N, 86° 40' E) from the 
mainland. The strait is so far within the straight baselines 
that any cbnvenient seaward route will be within internal waters. 
(Arctic Pilot 13.188) 
30. Proliv Iney (74° 50' N, 86° 26' E) is about 1 mile wide 
and 7 miles long, but about midway the fairway narrows to 2 
cables. It passes between Ostrov Nerpichiy and Ostrov Kolosovykh 
and connects the eastern and western parts of Proliv Stalintsa . 
(Arctic Pilot 13.200) 
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Linking Kara and Laptev Seas 
Four straits join the Kara and Laptev Seas. They are all 
entirely within the straight baselines that enclose the waters 
of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago as internal waters. 
Occasionally the route around the northern end of the archipelago 
is open. 
31. Proliv Borisa Vil'kitskogo (Vil'kitskiy Strait) (77° 23' 
N, 102° 07' E), at least 30 miles wide and 60 miles long, lies 
between Poluostrov Taymyr, the northernmost point of Asia, and 
Ostrov Bol 'shevik, the southernmost major island of Severnaya 
Zemlya. It is the shortest, best marked, and best known of the 
four straits. It is enclosed on the northwest by the straight 
baselines that enclose Arkhipelag Nordenshel'da and on the east 
by the lines that enclose Severnaya Zemlya). If it were not 
enclosed by straight baselines, it would contain a belt of high 
seas at least 6 miles wide. (Arctic Pilot 2.132) 
32. Proliv Shokal'skogo (Shokal'skiy Strait) (77° 55' N, 99° 
33' E), 10~ miles wide, 80 miles long, and deep enough for 
vessels of any draft, is between the northwestern side of Ostrov 
Bol 'shevik and Ostrov Oktyabr' skoy Revolyutsiy (October 
Revolution Island). It is within the . baselines that enclose 
Severnaya Zemlya. (Arctic Pilot 2.156) 
33. Proliv -Krasnoy Armii (Red Army Strait) (79° 40' N, 93° 
00' E), 1~ miles least width and 80 miles long, separates 
Arkhipelag Sedova and Ostrov Oktyabr'skoy ·Revolyutsii (October 
Revolution Island) on the south and southeast from Ostrov Pioner 
(Pioneer Island) and Ostrov Komsomolets to the north northwest. 
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It is enclosed by the straight baselines that enclose Severnaya 
zemlya. (Arctic Pilot 14.272) 
34. Proliv Yungshturm, unexamined but known to be 3 miles 
wide at its narrowest and 30 miles long, separates Ostrov Pioner 
(Pioneer Island) and Ostrov Komsomolets (80° 14' N, 91° 24' E). 
It is enclosed on the northwest by the straight baselines that 
enclose Severnaya Zemlya; at the southeast end it joins Proliv 
Krasnoy Armii (Red Army Strait). (Arctic Pilot 14.278) 
Laptev Sea Straits 
35. Preli v Mod ( Maud Strait) , 1~ miles wide, separates 
Ostrov Severnyy (76° 38' N, 112° 20' E) from Ostrov Yuzhnyy, in 
the Ostrova Petra (Peter Islands or Pyotr Islands). It can be 
used by vessels drawing up to 5 meters. It is within straight 
baselines that enclose the coastal islands off the northeast 
coast of Poluostrov Taymyr. (Arctic Pilot 15.37) 
36. Proliv Mur:rnantsa (Murmanets Strait), 7~ miles wide, 
separates Ostrov Yuzhnyy from Mys Vos'mogo Marta on Poluostrov 
Taymyr. It can be used by vessels drawing up to 5 meters. It 
is enclosed by straight baselines; the convenience of the seaward 
route will depend upon ice conditions. (Arctic Pilot 15.37) 
Linking the Laptev and East Siberian Seas 
Ostrova Novo Sibirskiy (New Siberian Islands) separate the 
Laptev and East Siberian Seas. There are several straits among 
the islands, but two major straits -- Proliv Dmitriya Lapteva and 
Proliv Savnikova -- join the seas directly. · They are within the 
straight baselines that enclose three of the major islands. 
37. Proliv Dmitriya Lapteva (Dmitriy Laptev Strait), 30 
miles wide and 63 miles long, lies between Mys Svyatoy Nos (72° 
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52' N, 150° 50' E) on the mainland and Ostrov Bol'shoy 
Lyakhovskiy. It will accommodate vessels drawing as much as 7 
meters. Arctic ice does not penetrate the strait, so ordinarily 
there is only one-year ice, and it is usually ice free in August 
and September. It is within the straight baselines that enclose 
Ostrova Novo Sibirskiy, so there is no exclusive economic zone 
despite the 30-mile width. The only seaward route would involve 
going north of the entire archipelago, then through or near 
Ostrova DeLong and on through the East Siberian Sea to Proliv 
Longa (Long Strait). (Arctic Pilot 2.206) 
38. Proliv Sannikova, 30 miles wide, lies between Ostrov 
Malyy Lyakhovskiy (74° 17' N, 140° 30' E) to the south and Ostrov 
Kotel'nyy to the north and offers an alternative route to Proliv 
Dmitriya Lapteva. It, too, is enclosed by the straight baselines 
that enclose Ostrova Novo Sibirskiy, so there is no exclusive 
economic zone despite the 30-mile width. (Arctic Pilot 2.221) 
39. Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy (75° 24' N, 145° 50' E), 
unexamined but known to be 25 miles wide and of uneven depth, 
separates the west end of Ostrov Novaya Sibir' from the east side 
of Ostrov Faddeyevskiy. Ostrov Novaya Sibir' is outside the 
straight baselines that link Ostrov Kotel'nyy and Ostrov 
Faddeyevskiy with the mainland, and so is the strait, placing its 
margins in the territorial sea. As a result, there is a belt of 
exclusive economic zone at least a mile wide running through the 
center of the strait. If the route through that belt can be 
shown to be of similar convenience to the routes through the 
belts of territorial sea, the territorial seas will be exempt 
from transit passage. The depths in the strait have not yet been 
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fully examined, but it is known that flats extend a considerable 
distance from both sides and that in the middle there are depths 
of 6 to 7 meters • Relative ice conditions, of course, are 
unpredictable. (Arctic Pilot 16.59) 
40. Proliv Zarya (75° 36' N, 136° 35' E) is 10 miles wide 
and 18 to 22 meters deep on the eastern side, 10 to 15 meters on 
the western side. It separates Ostrov Bel'kovskiy and Ostrov 
Kotel 'nyy. As only the. latter is enclosed by straight baselines, 
the strait is not enclosed and is situated entirely in the 
territorial sea. (Arctic Pilot 16.34) 
East Siberian Sea 
Ostrova Medvezhiy are six islands lying north of the mouth 
of Reka Kolyma ( Kolyma River) • Neither of its larger straits has 
been surveyed and the depths of the smaller straits are unknown. 
They are not enclosed by straight baselines. 
41. Proli v Melyokhov, width unknown and 9 meters deep in the 
fairway lies between Ostrov Krestovskiy (70° 52' N, 160° 35' E) 
on the west and Ostrov Pushkareva and Ostrov Leont'yeva on the 
east. It is situated entirely in the territorial sea. (Arctic 
Pilot 16.94) 
42. An unnamed strait, of unknown width and 7.3 meters deep 
in the fairway, lies between Ostrov Krestovskiy (70° 52' N, 160° 
35' E) and the mainland. It is situated entirely in the 
territorial sea. Any seaward route in the exclusive economic 
zone would have to go around the north and east of all six 
islands. (Arctic Pilot 16.94) 
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Linking East Siberian and Chukchi Seas 
43. Proliv Longa (Long Strait), 75 miles wide, lies between 
Ostrov Vrangelya (Wrangel Island) (71° 20' N, 179° 00' W) and 
Poluostrov Chukchi on the mainland, connecting the East Siberian 
and Chukchi Seas . As the strait .is not enclosed and is wider 
than 24 miles, a belt of exclusive economic zone runs through it. 
Nevertheless it cannot be regarded as a route of similar 
convenience as when the strait is frozen over the ice nearly 
always extends from the mainland to the island, so mariners are 
advised to seek and follow an inshore lead. The entire southern 
coast of Proliv Longa has baselines following the low-water mark, 
so any navigable waters are in the territorial sea. Likewise, 
the ice is too unpredictable to permit a seaward route to be 
designated as one of similar convenience. (Bering Sea Pilot 
12.38) 
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v. Soviet Jurisdiction over the Arctic Straits 
By and large, the legal status of a Soviet Arctic strait can 
be determined rather straightforwardly by identifying . the 
maritime zone in which it is located, through reference to Soviet 
legislation establishing baselines and zones (particularly the 
twelve-mile territorial sea), though some analysis may be 
required to ascertain whether the claims set forth by the 
legislation comport with the relevant conventions. The relevant 
legislation is described briefly in section A. 
For those straits enclosed by straight baselines pursuant 
to section 7, however, the issue is somewhat more complex, in 
that their status depends upon the character of the waters before 
their enclosure as internal waters. If the waters were 
previously considered to be internal waters, then they are not 
subject to innocent passage (LOSC 1982: article 8; TSC 1958: 
article 5) or to transit passage {LOSC 1982: article 35(a)). If, 
on the other hand, they were previously considered to be part of 
the territorial sea or the high seas, then innocent passage 
applies (LOSC 1982: article 8(2), TSC 1958: article 5(2)), and 
if they are in a strait used for international navigation, then 
Part III of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention applies, 
presenting the prospect of transit passage. (LOSC 1982: article 
35 (a) ) The difficulty arises because the waters' previous status 
is not nearly so clear as that created by statute. The factors 
affecting this prior status is discussed in section B. 
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A. Soviet Legislation 
The 1960 Statute on the Protection of the State Boundary 
established a 12-mile territorial sea. The 1971 amendments to 
that act offered the first official suggestion that the Soviet 
Union was considering the use of straight baselines: 
Coastal sea waters, twelve nautical miles in 
breadth, computed from the line of lowest ebb-tide 
both on the mainland and also around islands, or from 
the seaward line of internal sea waters of the USSR, 
and in those localities where the coastline is deeply 
indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of 
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity --
from straight baselines joining appropriate points, 
shall constitute the territorial waters of the USSR. 
(article 3; translated in Butler 1971:751) 
The reference to straight baselines was retained when the 
act was replaced in 1982, but the phrase "in those localities 
where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there 
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity" 
was dropped. The qualifying phrase had tracked the language of 
the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, and its elimination, in 
Pharand's phrase, gave the Soviet Union "considerable latitude 
as to where such lines may be used." ( 1988: 152) Apparently some 
Soviet commentators agreed, as they asserted that "international 
law recognises the sovereign right of each state to fix the 
length of such base lines at its own discretion" ( Butler 
1971:752), despite the preponderant Soviet view that baselines 
should not be drawn arbitrarily or unreasonably and should not 
ordinarily exceed 24 miles. (Butler 1972:418) 
It was not until 1984 and 1985 that the straight baselines 
were established (Decree of 1984; Decree of 1985), and their 
publication was both low-key and slow. (Franckx 1989:362-367) 
The list of 726 points was the longest ever published by ~ 
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coastal state. Of the 431 in the Arctic, 391 were for the 
continental coast and the rest for the coasts of single islands. 
The remainder were in the Baltic and Black Seas and the Pacific 
Ocean. (Scovazzi 1988:37) Less than a month after the 
publication of the baseline coordinates in Soviet Notices to 
Mariners in January 1986, the United States lodged an official 
protest to what it called excessive straight baselines in the 
1984 decree, which did not concern the Arctic baselines, and 
there is still some question as to whether the baselines conform 
to the rules of article 7 of the 1982 Convention and are thus 
valid as a matter of international law. ( Franckx 1989: 366) 
Butler has reprinted the list of baselines in translation, 
stressing that Notices to Mariners does not have the status of 
an official gazette and that it often contains abridged or 
summarized notices. (Butler 1986) 
B. Evidence of Pre-Enclosure Status 
The status of waters enclosed by straight baselines drawn 
pursuant to article 7 depends upon their previous, as well as 
their present, status. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain 
how those waters were regarded prior to the establishment of the 
straight baselines. For purposes of this paper, these include 
the straits of the three inter-sea archipelagos -- Novaya Zemlya, 
Severnaya Zemlya, and Ostrova Novo Sibirskiy -- and those straits 
lying landward of the coastal fringe islands enclosed by straight 
baselines, such as Proliv Kil' dinskiy. They , do not include those 
of the White Sea, which are enclosed by the closing line to a bay 
rather than by a straight baseline drawn pursuant to article 7. 
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To determine whether the waters of these straits were 
regarded as internal waters prior to their enclosure requires an 
examination of Soviet claims to historic waters and of the 
history of Soviet practice in exercizing jurisdiction over the 
area. 
1. Historic Waters 
The doctrine of historic waters has never been the subject 
of an international convention and is therefore subject to 
customary law, which on this particular point is vague, 
controversial, and, in most cases, indeterminative. According 
to O'Connell, it has three elements: effectiveness of control, 
effluxion of time, and the attitude of other states. 
chap. 11, esp. 427-435) 
(1982: 
The Soviet Union has never claimed any of the Arctic seas 
as historic waters, though Soviet legal writers have consistently 
made such claims. There is, however, some evidence of claims to 
historic straits, but the claims tend to be vague as to their 
ba s is and content . (Alexander 1987: 338) The 1960 statute on the 
s tate boundary made reference, in defining internal waters , to 
"s t raits, historically belonging to the USSR , " but did not 
identify a ny. (Butler 1978:86) In 1965, during an exchange of 
correspondence regarding the proposed passage o f t he United 
States Coast Guard icebreaker Northwind through Proli v 
Vil' ki tskogo, the Sovie t Union reportedly relied on historic 
straits, among other grounds, for objecting to the passage. 
(Butler 1978:86) It was in that year that a _ Soviet naval 
international law manual suggested for the first time in Soviet 
legal literature that some Arctic straits were historic waters: 
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The Dmitrii Laptev and Savnikov straits are 
regarded as belonging to the Soviet Union 
historically. They have never been used for 
international navigation, and in view of specific 
natural conditions and frequent ice jams, the legal 
status of these straits is sharply distinguished from 
all other straits being used for international 
navigation. (Butler 1978:86) 
Since that time, a fairly substantial body of literature 
advocating the inclusion of historic seas and historic straits 
in Soviet internal waters has emerged. The most extensive 
analysis of straits is that of P.O. Barabolia, who identified 
five categories: (1) straits leading to internal seas or bays 
and constituting internal water, (2) historic straits, (3) 
archipelagic straits, (4) straits leading to closed seas, and (5) 
international straits. 
historic straits as 
(Butler 1978:87) Barabolia defined 
situated apart from basic routes of international 
navigation and for a long period of time used only by 
one coastal State or leading to historic bays and 
seas. A peculiarity of historic straits consists in 
the fact that usually a coastal State expends numerous 
resources to exploit such straits, which go primarily 
to study the strait, create navigational equipment and 
signal systems, remove dangers, establish deep 
channels, and so forth. 
Such straits have important economic and defense 
significance for the coastal State. 
The regime of navigation in such straits is 
completely regulated by coastal State legislation. 
Merchant vessels in these straits proceed along 
previously stipulated routes and pilotage may be 
prescribed therein, since these straits in fact lead 
to shores and ports of that State to which they 
appertain. . Warships of other States may traverse 
historic straits only after obtaining the 
authorization of the coastal State. (Barabolia 
1972:17, translated by Butler (1978:87) 
(For a review of the literature, Butler 1978:86-87; Franckx 
1989:482-499) 
In 1985, the Soviet Union claimed a number of inlets as 
historic bays, identifying them as "internal waters of the USSR, 
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as waters historically belonging to the USSR." (Decree of 1985) 
Three of them were in the Arctic -- the White Sea, Cheshskaya Bay 
in the Barents Sea, and Baidaratskaya Bay in the Kara Sea -- and 
were enclosed by closing lines of 84. 4, 44, and 62. 5 miles, 
respectively. (Pharand 1988: 108; maps: Scovazzi 1988:39, 40) 
These are far longer than the 24-mile lines that would be 
permitted under the method of closing bays approved by the 1958 
and 1982 conventions (LOSC 1982: article 10; TSC 1958: article 
7). When, in 1957, the Soviet Union claimed Peter the Great Bay, 
in the Pacific Ocean, as historic internal waters, at least four 
states -- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Japan -- protested, but it appears that the Soviet Union has 
successfully enforced the claim. (Pharand 1988:107) Apparently 
no protests have been lodged specifically against the 1985 claims 
of the White Sea, Cheshskaya Bay, and Baidaratskaya Bay, and it 
appears likely that the Soviet Union will be able to demonstrate 
the requisite degree of control, time and international 
acquiescence to validate its assertion of historic title. 
None of the straits that are the subject of this paper is 
in Cheshskaya Bay or Baidoratskaya Bay, but seven, including the 
Gorlo, the major channel connecting the northern and southern 
basins, are in the White Sea. If the claim to the White Sea as 
an historic bay- is established, as this paper assumes, these 
seven straits will unambiguously be situated in internal waters 
and exempted from the Part III regime for international straits. 
The Soviet government has never formally claimed the Arctic 
seas themselves as historic waters, and Franckx argues that the 
claims to the three historic bays establishes conclusively that 
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the government does not regard the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, 
and Chukchi Seas to be historic internal waters. A review of the 
government's efforts to exercize jurisdiction there will provide 
further evi dence of the official Soviet view of the status of 
t hose waters . 
2. Soviet Practice in the Arctic Seas 
If the Soviet government has regarded the Arctic seas as 
historic internal waters of the Soviet Union, it can be expected 
to have enforced its sovereignty over those waters by requiring 
ships and aircraft to request permission to enter or fly over 
them. In fact, the Soviet government has not done so. 
In each navigation season between 1962 and 1967, United 
States Coast Guard icebreakers cruised, singly or in pairs, to 
the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi seas. Armstrong 
1972b:377 . In September 1965, the Northwind came under 
surveillance by Soviet aircraft and a warship while conducting 
two months of oceanographic experiments and research in the Kara 
Sea. The Soviet government did not object to the collection of 
water samples but is reported to have protested the removal of 
cores from the seabed, which could be regarded as a violation of 
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention (CSC 1958). 
19 88: 107- 110) 
(Pharand 
In 1967, the Edisto and the Eastwind , United States Coast 
Guard icebreakers , attempted to circumnavigate the Arc tic Ocean 
through the Northeast and Northwest Passages . No offici al 
objection was raised by the Sovie t Uni on until the vessels 
encountered difficult ice north of Severnaya Zemlya and announced 
that they planned to traverse t he Vil 'kitskiy Strai t , which is 
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less than 24 miles wide. The Soviet government denied passage , 
demanding · 30 days' notice, apparently on the ground that the 
vessels were armed (with machine guns). The United States 
11 
. disputed the validity of the refusal, but the vessels did not 
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attempt to enter the strait. Armstrong 1968b:332; 1972b:379. 
The text of the radio message received by the icebreakers 
from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Maritime Fleet included the 
following passage: 
Vil'kitskii Straits are within USSR territorial 
waters. Therefore sailing of any foreign navy ships 
in the straits is subject to regulations of safety of 
USSR frontiers. For passing the straits according to 
the above regulations, military ships must obtain 
preliminary permission of USSR Government through 
diplomatic channels one month before expected date of 
passage. (Franckx 1988:271) 
While it could be argued that the Soviet Uni on was treati ng 
Vil'kitskiy Strait as internal waters by denying passage to the 
American vessels, the evidence suggests that the refusal was 
based on a claim that the strait was in the territorial sea and 
subject to the right of innocent passage but that the proposed 
passage was not innocent. This is consistent with the Soviet 
Union's persistent objection to the application of innocent 
passage to foreign warships, and under the terms of the 1958 High 
Seas Convention the armed Coast Guard vessels could reasonably 
have been construed as warships. (Pharand 1988:107-110; Butler 
1978:125) 
In 1980, the Soviet Union similarly refused to allow the 
Swedish state-owned icebreaker Ymer to transit the Northeast 
Passage in the centenary of Nordenskjold's first passage but did 
not interfere with the vessel's scientific activities in the 
Barents Sea. (Theutenberg 1984:45-46) 
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3. National Transport Route 
In 1985, when another United States Coast Guard icebreaker, 
the Polar Star, transited the Northwest Passage, Canada objected 
on the ground that the waters of the Northwest Passage were 
internal waters, subject to no right of passage. Soviet public 
comment supported Canada's position and contended that the 
Northern Sea Route, too, was an internal waterway. (Armstrong 
1986:187; Dowd 1985) Since that time, little has been heard 
officially of this somewhat broader claim of sovereignty over the 
entire route. 
Canada is not the first state to claim a coastal transport 
route as internal waters even though much of it is seaward of the 
customary baselines. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the 
International Court of Justice declared the Indreleia to be "not 
a strait at all, but rather a navigational route prepared as such 
by means of artificial aids to navigation provided by Norway" 
(1951:132), thus sanctioning Norway's enclosure of the entire 
route by straight baselines. Canada has similarly enclosed its 
Arctic archipelago by straight baselines, even though its 
configuration bears no similarity to that of the fringe of 
coastal islands that makes up the Indreleia and is described in 
the 1958 and 1982 conventions. Pharand has made a strong case 
that the Canadian - baselines are compatible with international 
law, relying on, among other things, the Arctic character .of the 
islands and straits of the archipelago. (1988) 
It is not surprising, then, that Soviet jurists have 
proposed that the entire length of the Northern Sea Route should 
be regarded as Soviet internal waters, nor would it be surprising 
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if a successful resolution of the Canadian claim encouraged the 
Soviet Union to make such a claim official. 
What is the nature of the argument that the Northern Sea 
Route is an internal waterway? Should the fact that it 
occasionally passes beyond the Soviet maritime boundaries into 
the high seas or exclusive economic zone affect Soviet 
jurisdiction over the route? Kolodkin and Volosov say no: 
The integral nature of the Northern Sea Route as 
a transport route is not affected by the fact that 
individual portions of it, at one time or another, may 
pass outside of the aforesaid boundaries where the 
USSR exercises its sovereign rights or sovereignty in 
full (ie it may pass into the high seas). This fact 
is supplemented by factors of an historical order. 
The contribution of the Russian and Soviet State to 
not merely the study, exploration, and outfitting of 
the Northern Sea Route as a transport route, but also 
the entire polar region where continental and island 
territories of the Arctic belonging to the USSR are 
situated, is well known and internationally 
recognized. There is thus an aggregate of legal and 
other material circumstances which enable the Northern 
Sea Route to be relegated to the category of national 
transport routes. Having regard to this, one must 
conclude that the regulation of navigation along the 
Northern Sea Route is the prerogative of the USSR as 
the coastal state of this route. (1990:164) 
It is not entirely clear whether Kolodkin and Volosov are 
arguing for the enclosure of the entire Northern Sea Route as 
internal waters, which would constitute a rather expansive claim 
given the constantly shifting position of the route, (1990:164; 
Butler 1978: 54-57), or merely for Soviet jurisdiction to regulate 
navigation along the entire route, even when it passes outside 
internal waters and the territorial sea: 
[T)he Northern Sea Route as a whole, irrespective of 
whether it passes through territorial waters or not, 
should be relegated to · the category of national 
transport routes. The Norwegian Inderleja, for 
example, is such a route, as was confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its judgment 
of 18 December 1951 in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries 
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case, and by Norwegian legislation. The entire sea 
route from Varangersfjorden to the Porsangerfjord, 
irrespective of whether parts are within internal or 
territorial waters was laid, exploited and equipped 
exclusively by Norway and is therefore under its 
complete control and administration. 
The ICJ drew attention to two conditions: first 
the knowledge of other States about such claims; and 
second the absence of negative reactions on the part 
of other States. Further, the ICJ gave a positive 
reply to the question of whether the water areas were 
sufficiently connected to the land so as to be under 
the sovereignty of the coastal State. It should be 
emphasized that the positive reply of the ICJ with 
respect to Norway is fully applicable to the USSR. (1990:166) 
Kolodkin and Volosov go on to advance a separate argument, 
but with little legal foundation, that the Soviet Union should 
not be required to recognize the right of innocent passage 
through the many straits that were incorporated into Soviet 
internal waters through the drawing of straight baselines. 
Citing article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and article 8(2) of the 
1982 Convention, which retain the right of innocent passage 
through waters enclosed by straight baselines but previously 
considered to be high seas or territorial sea , they draw an 
analogy to Canadian claims in the Northwest Passage ( Pharand 
1988 :A-1-All) but fail to note that Canada, which has never 
ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, based its claims on customary international 
law. The Soviet Union, which has ratified the convention, is 
bound by article 5(2). 
One commentator has observed that, between the 12-mile 
territorial sea and the difficulty of negotiating ice passage 
without Soviet support , the Soviet Union has already effectively 
nationalized the route. (Shusterich 1984:257) 
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c. Summary 
The territorial sea is 12 miles wide measured from the 
baselines, which include an extensive set of straight baselines, 
the international validity of which is not settled. The straight 
baselines enclose, among other waters, the major straits 
connecting the Barents, Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian Seas, 
relegating the straits to internal waters. Unless the waters of 
the straits can be shown to have been regarded as internal waters 
before their enclosure, innocent passage and perhaps transit 
passage will apply. 
Despite the virtual unanimity of Soviet commentators and a 
few official statements that the straits are internal waters, the 
Soviet government has never claimed them as historic waters, and 
Soviet practice in the region is not consistent with their having 
been internal waters before their enclosure. Commentators have 
suggested that the entire Northern Sea Route should be regarded 
as a national transport route under Soviet jurisdiction, but this 
is not governmental policy. There is, in short, no strong 
argument that the straits were regarded as internal waters before 
their enclosure by straight baselines in 1985. 
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VI. Transit Passage in the Arctic Straits 
To summarize the conditions of transit passage described in 
Chapter IV, transit passage applies to a strait used for 
international navigation 
1. between one part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone, if the strait 
2. is situated in the territorial sea or in internal waters 
newly enclosed pursuant to article 7, and 
3. does not contain a route of similar convenience through 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone, and, 
4. if situated between an island and the mainland, does not 
have a seaward route of similar convenience through the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone, and 
5. is not governed by an international convention of long 
standing. 
If by reason of a seaward passage of similar convenience a 
strait is exempted from transit passage, nonsuspendable innocent 
passage applies ( article 45 ( 1) (a) • Nonsuspendable innocent 
passage applies also to straits used for international navigation 
between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and 
the territorial sea of a foreign state (article 45(l)(b),(2)). 
As all the straits of the Northern Sea Route under consideration 
here are entirely within the internal waters, territorial sea or 
the exclusive economic zone of the Soviet Union, article 
45(l)(b),(2) does not affect the analysis of this paper. 
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A. Conditions of Applying Transit Passage 
The following review discusses each of the five 
qualifications and identifies the Soviet Arctic straits to which 
it applies. 
1. Between Parts of the High Seas or EEZ 
This section applies to straits ••. between one 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone 
and another part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone. (article 37) 
The Corfu Channel court restricted its holding on innocent 
passage to straits "connecting two parts of the high seas." In 
1951, the International Law Commission, which had been created 
by the United Nations General Assembly to prepare codifications 
of various aspects of international law, including the law of the 
sea, began work on the law relating to the territorial sea. In 
both the geographical and use factors, the commission followed 
the Corfu Channel judgment: 
There must be no suspension of the innocent 
passage of foreign ships through straits normally used 
for international navigation between two parts of the 
high seas. 
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention expanded the definition 
to cover straits within the territorial sea of one state but with 
the territorial sea of another state at one end: "between one 
part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial sea of. a foreign State." (TSC 1958: article 16(4)) 
This additional scope applies to straits such as the Strait of 
Tiran, leading from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba, and 
prevents, for example, states in the geographical situation of 
Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia from closing off the Israeli port 
of Eilat from the high seas. 
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The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention has altered the 1958 
approach in two ways. The first is little more than a technical 
change, modifying the geographical definition of international 
straits to reflect the creation of the exclusive economic zone: 
This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. (article 37) 
The second change is the introduction of a dual regime for 
international straits in the territorial sea: very roughly, a new 
regime of transit passage for most straits connecting two parts 
of the high seas or exclusive economic zones (1982: article 37), 
but nonsuspendable innocent passage for straits connecting high 
seas or an exclusive economic zone with the territorial sea of 
a foreign state (article 45). (This two-tier system has come 
under criticism. (Reisman 1980:65-67)) 
A number of questions arise regarding the ef feet of straight 
baselines on this particular requirement. If a strait is 
enclosed at each end by newly drawn straight baselines, then 
under article 37 transit passage may apply if the other condition 
are satisfied. At each end of the strait, however, will be a 12-
mile belt of territorial sea through which ships must pass going 
to and from the exclusive economic zone. (figure A, p. 70) Is 
a strait in this situation being used for navigation between two 
parts of the high seas or exclusive economic zone? Without 
analyzing the matter in detail, it would appear that the transit 
passage regime is int~nded to apply to such situations. Nine of 
the straits considered here are in this situation: Yugorskiy 
Shar, Karskiye Vorota, and Matochkin Shar in Novaya Zemlya; 
69 
11 
Borisa Kil'kitskogo, Shokal'skogo, and Krasnoy Armii, and 
arguably Yungshturm, in Severnaya Zemlya ; and Dmitrya Lapteva and 
Sannikova, in Ostrova Novo Sibirskiye . 
A more problematic situation arises when a strait lies well 
within straight baselines. (figure B, below) A ship transiting 
the strait must pass through internal waters at either end of the 
strait. Unlike the first situation described above, the waters 
at either end of the strait, however, are not territorial sea but 
Figure A 
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Proliv Dmitriya Lapteva is 
enclosed at either end. 
Figure B. 
Proliv Matisena (17) is 
well behind baselines. 
-, 
Figure C 
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Proliv Kil'dinskiy is just 
behind straight baselines. 
internal waters. While the strait might well be used by a ship 
going from one part of the exclusive economic zone to another , 
it has to pass through internal waters at both ends of the 
strait. The question is whether , despite the language of the 
convention, a state should be permitted to insulate a strait 
otherwise available to international navigation from transit 
passage by enclosing it and the surrounding waters with straight 
baselines. 
Most of the 43 straits fall into this category: Nikol'skiy 
Shar, Kostin Shar, Krotova, Kazakova, Shirokiy, Uzkiy, 
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Petukhovskiy Shar, Sharapov Shar, Malygina, Ovtsyna, Krestovskiy, 
Matisena; Frama, Sverdrup, Zarya, Palander, Toros, Vostochnyy, 
Lena (on one end), Previn (on one end), Vega, Dubravina, 
Glubokiy, Stalintsa, and Iney. 
In the former case, any strai.ght route will take the ship 
from the strait to exclusive economic zone, though passing 
through territorial sea. In the latter case, the route could 
remain in internal waters as long as the straight baselines 
continues to enclose navigable waters. 
In a third possibility, a strait lies behind an island which 
is enclosed by straight baselines running more or less parallel 
to the strait, so that, unlike the first configuration, the 
strait does not intersect the baselines. (figure c, p. 70) A 
ship transiting the strait may, but need not, leave iuternal 
waters immediately by passing through the territorial sea on the 
way to the exclusive economic zone. This is the situation of 
Proliv Mod and Proliv Murmantsa and at one end of Proliv Lena and 
Proliv Preven. 
2. Internal Waters 
Nothing in this Part affects: (a) any areas of 
internal waters within a strait, except where the 
establishment of a straight baseline in accordance 
with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect 
of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not 
previously been considered as such (article 35) 
Taken together with article 35(b), which excludes the high 
seas and exclusive economic zones from the regime, this clause 
restricts the effect of the international straits regime to the 
territorial sea and to internal waters newly enclosed under the 
article 7 method for indented coasts and fringes of coastal 
islands . 
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What at first glance might appear to be one of the most 
significant factors in determining the status of a strait --
whether it has been enclosed by straight baselines, thus 
rendering i t part of the internal waters of the state turns 
out to have little, if any, effect .at all. If the enclosed 
waters had previously been considered as internal waters, then 
the straight baselines did not alter their status and thus had 
no effect regarding innocent passage (article 8(1)) or transit 
passage (article 35(a)). If, on the other hand, the enclosed 
waters had not previously been considered as internal, then 
innocent passage applies to the waters (article 8(2)) as if they 
were in the territorial sea, and without regard to whether they 
had previously been in the territorial sea, an exclusive economic 
zone, or the high seas; if the newly enclosed waters constitute 
a strait used for international navigation , then Part III of the 
1982 convention applies ( articles ( 35 (a), 3 7), including, in 
appropriate cases, transit passage, just as if the strait had not 
been enclosed. 
Nevertheless , it is useful to catalogue those straits that 
have been enclosed by straight baselines, as this provides a 
starting point for identifying those that have previously been 
r egarde d as i nternal waters and thus subject to neither innocent 
passage nor the regime for i nternational straits. This approach 
assumes that any waters clai med by t he Soviet Union as h i s t oric 
internal waters will have been enclosed by straight baselines , 
a reasonable inference for the Northeast Passage given that the 
1985 legislation covered, among other things, the entire Soviet 
coastline along the Northeast Pa ssage. (Decree of 1985) Any 
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state would have difficulty justifying a claim to historic 
internal · waters that had been overlooked by a comprehensive 
system of baselines. 
A number of straits along the Northern Sea Route have been 
enclosed by straight baselines drawn in accordance with 
provisions other than article 7's methods for enclosing indented 
coastlines and fringes of coastal islands. The White Sea, for 
example, has been enclosed as a historic bay, rendering all of 
its waters, including its straits, internal waters not subject 
to innocent passage or transit passage. 
At three of the four boundaries between the Soviet Arctic 
seas, the Northern Sea Route has been intersected by straight 
baselines incorporating major coastal archipelagos into internal 
waters. These are the only points along the Northern Sea Route 
that straight baselines, or for that matter any sovereignty or 
jurisdictional claims over coastal waters, create a conflict or 
potential conflict with a right of innocent passage that could 
cut through the Northern Sea Route and block through traffic. 
(One possible exception is the argument that the entire Northern 
Sea Route is an internal waterway analogous to the Norwegian 
Indreleia , but the Soviet Union has never formally claimed it as 
s uch . ) 
Twelve major straits are included in the waters enclosed by 
the baselines surrounding the three inter-sea archipelagos. 
Between t he Barents and Kara Seas , Proliv Karskiye Vorota (Kara 
Gates Strait) and Proliv Matochkin Shar lie wit hin the Novaya 
Zemlya archipelago, and Proliv Yugorskiy Shar separates the 
archipelago from the mainland. Bet ween the Kara a nd Laptev Se as, 
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Proliv Borisa Vil'kitskogo (Vil'kitskiy Strait) separates 
Severnaya Zemlya from Poluostrov Taymyr on the mainland, and 
three other straits -- Yungshturm, Krasnoy Armii (Red Army), and 
Shokal'skiy -- lie within the archipelago. Between the Laptev 
and East Siberian Seas are four navigable straits running between 
or south of Ostrova Novo Sibirskiye: Dmitriya Lapteva (along the 
mainland), Sannikova, Blagoveshchenskiy, and Zarya. The passage 
connecting the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas, Proli v Long a ( Long 
Strait) between Ostrov Vrangelya (Wrangel Island) and the 
mainland, has not been enclosed by straight baselines. 
Of the straits within a single sea, nearly all are enclosed 
by straight baselines drawn along an indented coast or a fringe 
of coastal islands. Like the enclosed inter-sea archipelagic 
straits, this means that their waters are entirely internal 
waters. If claimed as historic waters, these straits would not 
be subject to innocent passage or transit passage, but closing 
them to foreign vessels traffic would not block through traffic 
in the way closing the inter-sea archipelagic straits would. · Ice 
conditions permitting, these straits can be bypassed. 
In short, this applies to every strait under consideration 
except Proliv Zarya, Proliv Melyokhov, the unnamed strait at Reka 
Kolyma, Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy, and Proliv Longa. All five of 
these are in the territorial sea, and the last two have belts of 
exclusive economic zone running through them. 
Chapter V's survey of Soviet boundaries and jurisdictional 
c laims makes reasonably clear that none of the straits under 
consideration is in historic waters; having thus been newly 
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enclosed, they cannot be excluded by article 35(a) from the 1982 
international straits regime. 
3. Through Route of Similar Convenience 
This Part does not apply to a strait used for 
international navigation if there exists through the 
strait a route through the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to 
navigational and hydrological characteristics; in such 
routes, the other relevant Parts of this Convention, 
including the provisions regarding the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight, apply. (article 36) 
Nothing in this Part affects: ••• (b) the legal 
status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of 
States bordering straits as exclusive economic zones 
or high seas •••• (article 35(b)) 
A route in the high seas or an exclusive economic zone will 
exist through a strait when, through the entire length of the 
strait, the territorial seas generated by the land on each side 
of strait do not meet. This can occur in either or both of two 
ways in any given strait. Ordinarily it will occur when a strait 
is wider than 24 miles for its entire length, so that some belt 
of high seas or exclusive economic zone will lie between the two 
12-mile-wide territorial seas. If the passage is of similar 
convenience to the routes through the territorial seas, its 
presence obviates the need for transit passage through the 
territorial seas. 
A route through the high seas or exclusive economic zone 
might also occur -in narrower straits where a state, to avoid the 
imposition of the transit passage regime to its entire 
territorial sea within a strait, up to the baselines, might claim 
less than the allowable 12 miles of territorial sea, thus 
retaining high seas or exclusive economic zone through the strait 
and leaving the territorial sea to its customary regime of 
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innocent passage. By thus waiving some regulatory authority over 
the waters not claimed as territorial sea, the coastal state 
retains significantly greater authority over the waters it does 
claim as territorial sea. As of 1987, there were at least 33 
straits with a least width of 24 miles or less but nonetheless 
containing a route through high seas or exclusive economic zone, 
(Alexander 1987: 482), but this appears to have been due to 
territorial sea claims made before the 1982 convention approved 
the 12-mile limit. The Soviet Union has not varied the width of 
its territorial sea in the Arctic straits since the 1960 
legislation establishing the 12-mile territorial sea. 
To exempt the territorial waters in such a strait from 
transit passage, the route through the high seas or exclusive 
economic zone must be "of similar convenience." Even in non-
Arctic waters, where the depth is the critical, but reasonably 
stable, parameter of convenience, this issue is much more complex 
that it first appears. One critic has suggested that the rule 
may create a shifting regime, in which the existence of transit 
passage depends upon the nature of the ship. Consider a strait 
with a relatively shallow belt of high seas or exclusive economic 
zone at the center, and a much deeper fairway toward one side in 
the territorial sea. A tramp steamer drawing fifteen feet may 
find the high seas route to be of similar convenience and thus 
be entitled only to innocent passage in the territorial sea, 
while a supertanker drawing 55 feet may not be able to use the 
shallower high seas route and thus be entitled to transit passage 
in the deeper territorial sea. (Langdon 1990) 
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In the Arctic seas, it is far less likely than in other 
parts of the world that routes of similar convenience will exist 
in any effective way, as the condition of "convenience" hinges 
not only upon depth but upon hydrographical characteristics, the 
most conspicuous and variable of · which in the Arctic is the 
thickness, extent, and strength of sea ice. (Arikajnen 1988:20-
25) It is impossible to say with any certainty from one shipping 
season to another, sometimes from one day to another, which of 
two routes, seaward and landward of an island, is going to be the 
more convenient, or indeed possible. It seems fair to argue 
that, as a matter of law, in no case will a given route be 
reliably of similar convenience; thus article 36 should not, in 
and of itself, disqualify any Arctic strait from transit passage. 
Only five straits, measured between baselines, are wider 
than 24 miles at the narrowest point: Borisa Vil'kitskogo (30 
miles) between the Kara and Laptev Seas; Dmitriya Lapteva (30 
miles), Savnikova (30 miles), and Blagoveshchenskiy (25 miles), 
between the Laptev and East Siberian Seas; and Proliv Longa (75 
miles) between the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas. Of these, 
only Proliv Longa and Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy appear to contain 
any belt of exclusive economic zone, as the others are entirely 
enclosed in internal waters. 
4. Seaward Route of Similar Convenience 
[I] f the strait is formed by an island of a State 
bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage 
shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island 
a route through the high seas or through an exclusive 
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to 
navigational and hydrographical characteristics. 
(article 38) 
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This qualification is designed to enhance, at relatively low 
cost to freedom of navigation, the jurisdiction and security 
interests of a coastal state in a strait bordering the mainland. 
It applies only when an alternative route of similar convenience 
exists seaward of an island that · forms a strait with the 
mainland. Furthermore, the seaward route must be in the high 
seas or an exclusive economic zone, where the coastal state's 
jurisdiction to impede or regulate navigation is at a minimum and 
where the rights of overflight by aircraft and submerged transit 
by submarine already exist. The clause was designed to apply to 
such straits as Messina, between Sicily and the Italian mainland, 
and Pemba, between Pemba Island and the Tanzanian mainland. 
As with high seas routes through a strait, it is far less 
likely in the Arctic than in other parts of the world that 
seaward routes of similar convenience will exist, as the 
thickness, extent, and strength of sea ice is unpredictable. 
Again it seems that, as a matter of law, there can be no seaward 
route of similar convenience. The Arctic problem aside, the 
convention offers little guidance as to standards, such as a 
minimum width, for determining similar convenience. (Alexander 
1987:336). 
Twenty significant Soviet Arctic straits lie between the 
mainland and an island: 
In the Barents Sea, Proli v Kil' dinskiy, between the mainland 
and Ostrov Kil'din, is deep in the fairway · and never freezes, 
which would mitigate against there being a seaward route of 
similar convenience should it be necessary to make a case-by-case 
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determination, through it is frequently blocked by ice carried 
in by tidal currents. 
Linking the Barents and Kara Seas, Proliv Yugorskiy Shar 
lies between Ostrov Vaygach and the mainland, but its location 
at the landward end ot Novaya Zemlya precludes any possibility 
of a seaward route exemption. 
In the Kara Sea, Proliv Morozova between Ostrov Mestnyy and 
the mainland; Proliv Sharapov Shar between the mainland and a 
chain of sandy spits, seaward of which depths range between 2-3/4 
fathoms and nine fathoms, but vessels use the channel despite its 
shallowness when forced by ice to navigate close to the shore; 
Proliv Malygina between Ostrov Belyy (White Island) and 
Poluostrov Yamal, in which depths constantly change, but a light 
draft vessel can save 50 miles by not having to pass around 
Ostrov Belyy, suggesting that the seaward route is not of similar 
convenience; and Proliv Krestovskiy between Ostrov Krestovskiy 
and the mouth of Reka Yenisey (Yenisey River). 
The Dikson Island straits, also in the Kara Sea, separate 
Ostrov Dikson from the mainland: Proliv Lena and Proliv Preven, 
both narrow and lying north of the island, and Proliv Vega on the 
south side. 
In the Shkhery Minina (Minin Skerries), also in the Kara 
Sea, Proliv Stalintsa (Stalinets Strait) between the northeastern 
group and the mainland; Proliv Frama (Fram Strait) between Ostrov 
Nansena and Poluostrov Yerermeyeva; Proliv Zarya between Ostrov 
Bonevyy and the mainland; and Proliv Vostochnyy between Ostrov 
Pilota Makhotkina and Poluostrov Trud. 
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Linking the Kara and Laptev Seas is Proliv Vil'kitskogo 
between Ostrov Bol'shevik and Poluostrov Taymyr. 
In the Laptev Sea are Proliv Mod (Maud Strait) and Proliv 
Murmantsa, both between the Ostrova Petra (Peter Islands) and the 
mainland. 
Linking the Laptev and East Siberian Seas is Proliv Dmitrya 
Lapteva between Ostrov Bol 'shoy Liakhovskiy and the mainland, and 
in the East Siberian Sea is an unnamed strait between Ostrov 
Krestovskiy Island and the mainland. 
Finally, linking the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas is 
Proli v Long a ( Long Strait) , lying between Ostrov Vrangelya 
(Wrangel Island) and the mainland. If Ostrov Vrangelya is a part 
of the Soviet Union, then it is subject to the provisions of 
article 38, which applies only when the island and mainland 
bordering the strait belong to the same state. Al though its 
status is unclear, because of arguable claims to sovereignty by 
the Soviet Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, there is, at least, a de facto acceptance of Soviet 
control. (Westermeyer and Shusterich 1984:256-260) 
5. Long-Standing International Conventions 
Nothing in this Part affects: ( c) the legal 
regime in straits in which passage is regulated in 
whole or in part by long-standing international 
conventions in force specifically relating to such 
straits. (article 35) 
This exception was designed to exclude the Bosporus, the 
Danish Straits, and the Straits of Magellan, from the transit 
passage regime on the ground they were better served by existing 
legal regimes that already provided for freedom of .navigation 
through the straits. (Moore 1980: 111) There are no long-
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standing international conventions relating to any of the straits 
under consideration here, and this clause has no effect on the 
Soviet Arctic straits. 
B. Straits Used for International Navigation 
This section applies to straits which are used 
for international navigation •••• " (article 37) 
One crucial condition of the regime for international 
straits -- that the strait be used for international navigation -
has been disregarded until this stage of the analysis. 
Inasmuch as the question under consideration is the status of the 
straits should they be used for international navigation, the 
discussion so far has assumed that the Northern Sea Route Project 
will succeed and that the straits will be used for international 
navigation. Nevertheless, the "fact" that ships of more than one 
state will be using the straits will not necessarily satisfy 
article 37; a seemingly unambiguous phrase in a statute or 
international convention will almost inevitably have a legal 
content to supplement its ordinary meaning. 
(Oddly, a relevant exception to this may be the even more 
fundamental term "strait, " which appears to have no legal meaning 
in the convention and is applied in its dictionary or 
geographical sense. (Churchill and Lowe 1988:87) Nevertheless, 
sooner or later a dispute can be expected to arise as to whether 
a particular passage constitutes a strait within the meaning of 
the convention, and the resolution of that incident will begin 
f to establish a legal content to the meaning of "strait.") 
1. The Law 
For the new regime to be applied to the straits of the 
Northern Sea Route, they must be "used for international 
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navigation" within the meaning of article 37. While there is 
little history to article 37, the phrase did derive from 
customary law by way of the Corfu Channel case and the 1958 
convention, which will help cast light on its meaning. 
The "use" element in the identification of international 
straits is far more problematical than the geographical one, but 
there has been surprisingly little discussion of its precise 
scope and content, given its importance as the basic definitional 
component of the straits regime. This apparent lack of interest 
in the scholarly literature may be attributable to a general 
understanding, reflected in the practice of states, as to what 
constitutes an international strait, an understanding that has 
failed only in the fairly extreme case of a relatively 
unimportant strait forming the frontier between two hostile 
states in a tense, post-war, revolutionary period. One of the 
few other situations in which the question is likely to become 
contentious is the first use for international navigation of a 
strait that theretofore has been inaccessible or purely local. 
This scenario has already ignited a dispute between Canada and 
the United States over rights of transit through the Northwest 
Passage straits of the Canadian Arctic. (Pharand 1988) A 
similar controversy appears almost inevitable in the Soviet 
Arctic should the straits along the Northern Sea Route ever be 
opened to international traffic. 
Prior to Corfu Channel, a distinction had been drawn between 
"indispensability" and "usage" in international navigation 
(O'Connell 1982:315), and the right of nonsuspendable passage 
arguably attached only to those straits .that were indispensable 
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to international navigation. The International Court of Justice 
abolished the distinction by holding that the decisive criterion 
was that the strait was used in international navigation. That . 
most of the traffic through the channel was local and that from 
the standpoint of international ·shipping it was merely an 
alternative route between the Aegean and Adriatic Seas were 
irrelevant to the channel's legal status as an international 
strait. 
McDougal and Burke apparently agree with that aspect of the 
holding: 
" [ T] he importance of straits to international 
transport and, presumably, the degree of special 
protection required, may be a function of time and of 
variations in conditions too complex to succumb to 
easy or effective foresight. It would appear, 
accordingly, that for community policy purposes all 
straits, irrespective of their utility at any 
particular period in time, ought to be treated alike 
for purposes of rejecting coastal authority to deny 
all passage." (1987:189) 
It was upon the suggestion of the Soviet delegate that the 
International Law Commission, in its draft codification, inserted 
the word "normally" into the International Court's phrase 
"straits used for international navigation." The commentary to 
the draft article, however, explained that the commission 
intended the article to conform to Corfu Channel. 
1987:401) 
(Mangone 
This was reflected in the language of the 1958 Territorial 
Sea Convention, which dropped the word "normally" and preserved 
innocent passage through "straits which are used for 
international navigation •••• " · (article 16(4)) The 1982 
· convention adopted that language. (article 37) 
83 
2. Unresolved Issues 
If the Northern Sea Route is opened to foreign conunercial 
shipping, the major inter-sea straits certainly, and many of the 
smaller straits probably, will be used for international 
navigation. At what point will the traffic be heavy enough to 
justify a claim of transit passage through the internal waters 
of, say, Novaya Zemlya. On one level, it would not be 
unreasonable to assert that any foreign vessel engaged in 
international navigation would be entitled to pass through under 
the new regime, that the regime applies to the first, and every 
subsequent, vessel to make the voyage: The convention says 
"which are used for" and that is precisely what it mean; it is 
designed to protect the first vessel through. 
The issue is not so simple, however, for two reasons. 
First, the new regime of straits does not apply only to foreign 
conunercial vessels. It also applies to foreign warships, 
submarines, and aircraft. Did the convention intend to open the 
airspace over a strait to foreign aircraft after one conunercial 
vessel has passed through? When the Tiksi sailed from Hamburg 
to Osaka in 1989, did it clear the way for submarines and 
overflight? 
Second, the new regime does not apply only to ships invited 
by the coastal state. If an American submarine were to transit 
Proliv Vil'kitskogo, submerged and uninvited, it would be using 
the strait for international navigation. Would the first British 
plane to fly over the strait be using it for international 
navigation, or does a right of overflight depend .upon use by 
ships? Is there a possibility of "bootstrapping" a strait into 
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transit passage simply by transiting it? It has been suggested 
that, in the absence of any generally accepted criteria, 
"[p)erhaps one foreign-flag vessel would suffice." 
1987a:490 fn.3) 
(Alexander 
These questions have not been· answered, nor do they appear 
even to have been widely discussed, largely because the vast 
majority of the world's straits have enjoyed a reasonably stable 
regime for years and the questions are largely irrelevant. It 
is only in the rare instances that previously impassable straits 
become commercially viable that these questions are of more than 
academic interest. 
The few official statements by the governments of Canada and 
the Soviet Union regarding the legal status of their Arctic 
straits have tended to deal with historical claims and the inland 
transport route, but apparently have made no attempt to define 
the use requirement. This paper does no more than raise these 
particular questions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Of the 43 straits considered, how many may become subject 
to transit passage if the Northern Sea Route Project succeeds in 
opening the Arctic seas to international shipping? On the 
assumption that they all will be "used for international 
navigation" within the meaning of article 37, there are five 
conditions any one of which may disqualify a strait from transit 
passage or from the entire regime for international straits: 
(1) A through route of similar convenience in the high seas 
or exclusive economic zone. The Soviet Union has not narrowed 
the territorial sea in any straits to avoid the application of 
transit passage, and only five straits are wide enough (greater 
than 24 miles) to have such a belt between two 12-mile 
territorial seas. Of these, only two, Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy 
and Proliv Longa, have belts of exclusive economic zone; the 
others are in internal waters. It seems, however, that the 
unpredictability of ice conditions makes it impossible to 
categorize any Arctic route as similarly convenient. 
(2) A seaward route of similar convenience through the high 
seas or exclusive economic zone, if the strait is between an 
is land and the mainland. As a matter of location, only 20 
straits are capable of satisfying this exception. Again, the 
unpredictability of ice rules out any similarly convenient route. 
( 3) Being in internal waters ( other than those newly 
enclosed under article 7 's method) or in the high seas or 
exclusive economic zone. None of the straits contains high seas , 
and only two , Proliv Longa and Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy , contain 
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exclusive economic zone, along with territorial sea. Three --
Proliv Zarya, Proliv Melykhov, and the Kolyma River strait -- are 
in the territorial sea. All 38 others are in internal waters, 
but in all cases the waters have been enclosed by baselines 
ostensibly complying with article .7 's procedure for deeply 
indented coasts. Only the belts of exclusive economic zone 
running through Proliv Longa and Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy are 
exempted by this exception, and their territorial sea remains 
unaffected. 
( 4 ) Not being between two parts of the high seas or 
exclusive economic zone. This is the most problematic exception, 
as it is not entirely clear how it relates to straits situated 
in internal waters. Five straits -- Blagoveshchenskiy, Zarya, 
Melyokhov, Longa, and the Kolyma River strait -- unambiguously 
connect two parts of the exclusive economic zone. Nine others 
would but for the belt of territorial sea outside the baseline 
at each end of each strait and ought to be regarded as serving 
navigation between parts of the exclusive economic zone: 
Yugorskiy Shar, Karskiye Vorota, Matochkin Shar, Borisa 
Vil'kitskogo, Shokal'skogo, Krasnoy Armii, Yungshturm, Dmitriya 
Lapteva, and Savnikova. The other 29 are all entirely within 
internal waters and arguably may be excluded, though such an 
interpretation would tend to create a conflict between article 
37 and the exception contained in article 35 (a). For that 
reason, it seems reasonable to suggest that they do satisfy the 
article 37 condition and are not excluded from transit passage 
on this basis. 
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(5) Being subject to a long-standing international 
convention. As already discussed, none of these straits is 
covered by such a convention. 
In . brief, it appears that none of the five exemptions 
removes any of the 43 straits from the overall regime or from 
transit passage. Whether, assuming that the Northern Sea Route 
Project eventually succeeds, they will be "used for international 
navigation" within the meaning of article 37, is still an open 
question. 
In the event, many of the issues surrounding transit passage 
may turn out to be uncontroversial. The straits of the Northeast 
Passage are not, for the most part, suitable for submerged 
transit by submarine. The navigational freedoms of the high seas 
and exclusive economic zone already permit foreign warships free 
access to most of the Arctic seas, and the conventions guarantee 
them nonsuspendable innocent passage through the straits, if the 
analysis above is correct. The only significant practical 
difference, then, may be the overflight provision of transit 
passage, which could prove of great importance if it is found to 
grant foreign military aircraft access to coastal routes along 
much of the Soviet Arctic . 
Many of the issues are still unresolved, and given the 
nature of international lawmaking, may remain so long after 
foreign ships are regularly plying the Northern Sea Route. 
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Key to the Maps of Stiaits and Baselines 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
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8. 
9. 
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14. 
15. 
16. 
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19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40 . 
-41. 
42. 
43. 
Proliv Kil'dinskiy (Kil'din Strait) 
Proliv Nikol'skiy Shar 
Proliv Kostin Shar 
Proliv Krotova 
Proliv Kazakova 
Proliv Shirokiy 
Proliv Uzkii Strait 
Proliv Yugorskiy Shar 
Proliv Karskiye Vorota (Kara Gates Strait) 
Proliv Matochkin Shar 
Proliv Petukhovskiy Shar 
Proliv Morozova 
Proliv Sharapov Shar 
Proliv Malygina 
Proliv Ovtsyna 
Proliv Krestovskiy 
Proliv Matisena 
Proliv Frama (Fram Strait) 
Proliv Sverdrup 
Proliv Zarya 
Proliv Palander 
Proliv Toros 
Proliv Vostochnyy 
Proliv Lena 
Proliv Preven 
Proliv Vega 
Proliv Dubravina 
Proliv Glubokiy 
Proliv Stalintsa (Stalinets Strait) 
Proliv Iney 
Proliv Borisa Vil'kitskogo (Vil'kitskii Strait) 
Proliv Shokal'skogo (Shokal'skii Strait) 
Proliv Krasnoy Armii (Red Army Strait) 
Proliv Yungshturm 
Proliv Mod (Maud Strait) 
Proliv Murmantsa (Murmanets Strait) 
Proliv Dmitriya Lapteva (Dmitrii Laptev Strait) 
Proliv Sannikova 
Proliv Blagoveshchenskiy 
Proliv Zaria 
Proliv Melyokhov 
Kolyma River strait 
Proliv Longa (Long Strait) 
J 
Appendix 3 -- Glossary 
arkhipelag 
belaya (yy, oye)_ 
bol'shaya (oy, oye) 
gavan' 
guba 
kamen' 
malaya (yy, oye) 
more 
mys 
nos 
novaya (yy, oye) 
ostrov 
poluostrov 
proliv 
reka 
salma 
severnaya (yy, oye) 
shar 
vorota 
vostochnaya (yy, oye) 
. vostok 
zaliv 
zapadnaya (yy, oye) 
zemlya 
archipelago 
white 
great, large 
harbor, basin 
gulf, bay, inlet 
rock, stone 
little, small 
sea 
cape, point, or headland 
headland 
new 
island 
peninsula 
strait 
river 
strait 
northern 
channel 
gap, gate, entrance 
eastern 
east 
gulf, bay, inlet 
western 
land 
Source: Arctic Pilot 1985:x-xi 
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Appendix 4 
of the 1982 
-- Relevant Provisions 
United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 
SECTION 3. INNOCENT PASSAGE 
IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA 
SUBSECTION A. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL SHIPS 
Article 17 
Right of innocent passage 
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, 
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
Article 18 
Meaning of passage 
I. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: 
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a road-
stead or port facility outside internal waters; or 
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roads tead or port 
facility. 
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious . However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the pur -
pose of rendering assistance to persons , ships or aircraft in danger or distress . 
Article 19 
Meaning of innocent passage 
I. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with 
this Convention and with other rules of international law. 
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in 
any of the following activities: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in 
viola tion of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter 
of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the 
coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(D the launching, landing or taking on board of any military de vice ; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary 
to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of 
the coastal State ; 
Jh) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
U) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any 
other facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
Article 20 
Submarines and other underwater vehicles 
In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required 
to nav iga te on the surface and to show their flag. 
A-11 
Article 21 
laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to 
innocent passage 
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations , in conformity with the 
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to 
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the 
following: 
· 
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; 
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or 
installations; 
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines; 
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; 
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of 
the coastal State; 
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the preven-
tion, reduction and control of pollution thereof; 
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; 
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal , immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. 
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, man-
ning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally ac-
cepted international rules or standards. 
3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accept-
ed international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. 
Article 22 
Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes 
in rhe territorial sea 
1. The coastal State may, where necessary having regard to the safety of navi-
gation, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its 
territorial sea to use ·such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may 
designate or p,escribe for the regulation of the passage of ships. 
2. In particular , tankers , nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or 
other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required 
to confine their passage to such sea lanes. 
3. In the designation of sea lanes and the prescription of traffic separation 
schemes under this article, the coastal State shall take into account: 
(a) th e recommendations of the competent international organization; 
(b) any channels customarily used for international navigation; 
(c) the special characteristics of particular ships and channels; and 
(d) the density of traffic. 
4. The coastal State shall clearly indicate such sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes on charts to which due publicity shall be given. 
Article 23 
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or 
other inherently dangerous or noxious substances 
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently 
dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe special precau-
tionary measures established for such ships by international agreements. 
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Article 24 
Duties of the coastal State 
1. The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships 
through the territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention. In partic-
ular, in the application of this Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted 
in conformity with this Convention, the coastal State shall not: 
(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of 
denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or 
(b) discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against 
ships carrying cargoes to , from or on behalf of any State. 
2. The coastal State shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to naviga-
tion, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea . 
Article 25 
Rig~ts of protection of rhe coastal State 
1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to pre-
vent passage which is not innocent. 
2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility 
outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary 
steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those 
ships to internal waters or such a call is subject. 
3. The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among 
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the 
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protec-
tion of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take 
effect only after having been duly published. 
Article 26 
Charges which may be levied upon foreign ships 
1. No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their 
passage through the territorial sea. 
2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial 
sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship. These charges 
shall be levi ed without discrimination. 
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ular, in the application of this Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted 
in conformity with this Convention, the coastal State shall not: 
(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of 
denying or impairing the right of innocen t passage; or 
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PART Ill 
STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION 
SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 34 
Legal status of watersforming straics used for 
· internacional navigacion 
1. The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation es-
tablished in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters 
forming such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sov-
ereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil. 
2. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is exer-
cised subject to this Part and to other rules of international law. 
Nothing in this Part affects: 
Arcic/e 35 
Scope of chis Parr 
(a) any areas of internal waters within a strait, except where the establish-
ment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in 
article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not 
previously been considered as such; 
(b) the legal status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of States border-
ing straits as exclusive economic zones or high seas; or 
(c) the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in 
part by long-standing international conventions in force specifically relat-
ing to such straits. 
Article 36 
High seas rouces or rouces chrough exclusive economic zones 
through straits used for inlernational navigation 
' . This Part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if there 
exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an exclusive 
economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hy-
drographical characteristics; in such routes, the other relevant Parts of this 
Convention, including the provisions regarding the freedoms of navigation 
and ovetflight, apply 
SECTION 2. TRANSIT PASSAGE 
Arcicle 37 
Scope of chis seccion 
This section applies to straits which are used for internat ional navigation be-
tween one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part 
of th e high seas·or an exclusive economic zone. 
Arcicle 38 
Righ t of transit passage 
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of 
transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except that , if the strait is formed 
by an island of a State bord ering the strait and its mainland , transit passage shall 
not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or 
through an exclusive economic zone of similar con ve nience with respect to 
navigational and hydrographical characteristics. 
2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordan ce with this Part of the free·-
dom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expe-
ditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive econom ic 
zone. However, the requirement of continuous and ex peditious transit does 
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not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or 
returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to 
that State. 
3. Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through 
a strait remains subject to the other applicable pro visions of this Convention. · 
Article 39 
Duties of ships and aircrafi during transit passage 
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit . 
passage , shall: 
(a) proceed without delay through or ove r the strait; 
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in 
any other manner in violation of the principles of international Jaw 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal 
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered n~cessary 
by force majeure or by distress; 
(d) comply with other rele vant pro visions of this Part. 
2. Ships in transit passage shall: 
(a) comply with generally accepted international regula tions, procedures 
and practices for safety at sea, including the In ternat ional Regul at ions 
for Preventing c;::ollisions at Sea; · 
(b) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures 
and practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
from ships. 
3. Aircraft in transit passage shall: 
(a) observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Ci vil Avia-
tio n Organization as they apply to civ il aircraft; state aircraft will nor m al-
ly comply with such safety measures and will at all times operate with 
due regard for the safety of navigation; 
(b) at all time·s monitor the radio frequency assigned by the competent inter-
nationally designated air traffic control authority or the appropriate in te r-
nat ional d ist ress radio frequency. 
Article 40 
Research and survey ac1iri1ies 
During transit passage, foreign ships, including marine scientific research and 
hydrographic survey ships , m ay not carry out any research or survey activities 
without the prior au thorization of the States bordering straits. 
Anicle 41 
Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in straits used/or 
international narigarion 
1. In conformity with this Part, States bordering straits may designate sea 
lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for navigation in straits where 
necessary to promote the safe passage of ships. 
2. Such States may , when circumstances require , and after giving du e publici-
ty thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any sea 
lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescri bed by them. 
3. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally 
accepted international regulat ions. 
4. Before designating or substituting sea Janes or prescribing or substituting 
traffic separation schemes, States borde ring straits shall refer proposals to the 
competent international organization with a v ie w to their adoption. The organi-
zation may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be 
agreed with the States bordering the straits, after which the States may desig-
nate, prescribe or substitute them . 
5. In respect of a strait where sea lanes or traffic separation schemes through 
the wate rs of two or more States bordering the strait are being proposed, the 
States concerned shall co-ope rate in formulating proposals in consultation with 
the competent international organization. 
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6. States bordering straits shall clearly indicate all sea lanes and traffic separa-tion schemes designated or prescribed by them on charts to which due publicity 
shall be given. 
7. Ships in transit passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separa-tion schemes established in accordance with this article. 
Article 42 
Laws and regulations of States bordering straits 
relating to transit passage 
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of all 
or any of the following: 
(a) the safety of navigation and the regu lation of maritime traffic, as provided in article 41; 
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to ap-plicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait; (c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear; 
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in con-travention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regu-lations of States bordering straits. 
2. Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships or in their a
0
pplication have the practical effect of denying, haruper-ing or impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this section. 3. States bordering straits shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply with such laws and regulations . 
5. The flag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft entitled to sov-ereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and regulations or other provisions of this Part shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering straits. 
Article 43 
Navigational and safety aids and other improvements and the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution 
User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement co-operate: (a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international navigation; and 
(b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships. 
Article 44 
Duties of States bordering straits 
States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage and shall give ap-propriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which they have knowledge . There shall be no suspension of transit passage. 
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SECTION 3. INNOCENT PASSAGE 
Article 45 
Innocent passage 
1. The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II, section 3, 
sha ll apply in straits used for international navigation : 
(a) excluded from the application of the regime of transit passage under ar-
ticle 38, paragraph 1; or 
(b) between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the 
territorial sea of a foreign State. 
2. There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits. 
SECTION 8 . ICE-COVERED A.REAS 
Anicle 23 4 
Ice-col'ered areas 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discrim inato ry laws 
and regulations for the preventio n, reduction and control of marine pollut io n 
from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic 
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice 
covering- such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional 
hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause 
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws 
and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and pre-
servation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific 
evidence. 
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